Autism and the Question of the Human

Abstract

The article explores how normative notions of emotions and interaction are active in constructions of the categories of "human" and "animal" in different discourses about autism: scientific and autobiographical. In the scientific discourse of autistic emotionality, a deficit perspective of autism is central. The general affective deficit discourse relies on normative discursive notions of "humanity" or "human emotionality." Thus, neurotypicals are produced as real "humans" and neurotypical emotionality as "normal" human emotionality. This human normativity is challenged in the Swedish autobiographical texts by Gunilla Gerland (b. 1963), Iris Johansson (b. 1945) and Immanuel Brändemo (b. 1980). Along with American authors of autobiographies about autism, such as Temple Grandin's Thinking in Pictures (1995) and Dawn Prince-Hughes' Songs of the Gorilla Nation (2004) they destabilize the categories of "human" and "animal" by identifying with nonhuman animals, describing themselves as such, or feeling disqualified as real humans.

Seeing More Than Human: Autism and Anthropomorphic Theory of Mind

“…Thus, it may be that a diminished physical sense of self allows individuals with ASD to view themselves in less human and more anthropomorphic ways, a viewpoint suggested in experiential accounts by those with the condition ( Prince-Hughes, 2004 ). Thus, the increased social processing of anthropomorphic versus human agents in socially typical ways may reflect an elicitation of personal knowledge in relation to non-human entities through a processing of the self as “other than human” ( Bergenmar et al, 2015 ).…”

Languages of sensing: Bringing neurodiversity into more-than-human geography

“…Co-produced relationships and ‘being-with’ are significant themes in more-than-human thinking that describe the phenomenal lives of humans and non-humans – though individually and uniquely experienced – as shared alongside one another, contributing to the becoming-with of their respective individualities and mutual relationships (Bingham, 2006; Latimer, 2013; see also Haraway, 2003). Neuro-diverse autobiography frequently describes experiences of ‘being-with’ non-humans that have profound significance to authors who struggle with human–human relationality as a result of neurological-difference (Bergenmar et al., 2015; Davidson and Smith, 2009). Like many of these neuro-diverse authors, understandings of places, organisms, and objects with personality and feel often make more sense to me than human-people, whilst the sensory sensitivities that facilitate these relationships are the same that can isolate me from meaningful human–human interactions (e.g.…”

“…Like many of these neuro-diverse authors, understandings of places, organisms, and objects with personality and feel often make more sense to me than human-people, whilst the sensory sensitivities that facilitate these relationships are the same that can isolate me from meaningful human–human interactions (e.g. see Bergenmar et al., 2015; Davidson and Smith, 2009; Williams, 1994: 113). Autobiographical writers similarly describe their relationships with non-humans as being free of the ambiguous meaning and confounding abstract communication that can make human interaction overwhelmingly confronting (Davidson and Smith, 2009; Grandin, 1995).…”

“…Historical and ongoing ‘lessening’ of both non-humans and neuro-diverse humans (Bergenmar et al., 2015; Plumwood, 2002a; Wolfe, 2013) is a key overlap between fields, playing a profound role in how I, as a geographer, make sense of and consider our individual realities through empathetic common ground. Anthropocentric discourse tends to reduce non-human entities to background context in a human-centred world (Davidson and Smith, 2009; Wolfe, 2013; see also Haraway, 2003; Plumwood, 2002a) in much the same way that the intense impairment focus on neurological-difference has reduced our ‘qualification as human’ (Baggs, 2006; Bergenmar et al., 2015), often resulting in stigmatisation and exclusion (Corrigan and Watson, 2002; Philo and Metzel, 2005; Shtayermman, 2009). A ‘less-than-human’ condition has been applied to those who fall outside a very narrow status quo (Baggs, 2006; Bergenmar et al., 2015; Philo, 2016; Plumwood, 2002a).…”

“…Anthropocentric discourse tends to reduce non-human entities to background context in a human-centred world (Davidson and Smith, 2009; Wolfe, 2013; see also Haraway, 2003; Plumwood, 2002a) in much the same way that the intense impairment focus on neurological-difference has reduced our ‘qualification as human’ (Baggs, 2006; Bergenmar et al., 2015), often resulting in stigmatisation and exclusion (Corrigan and Watson, 2002; Philo and Metzel, 2005; Shtayermman, 2009). A ‘less-than-human’ condition has been applied to those who fall outside a very narrow status quo (Baggs, 2006; Bergenmar et al., 2015; Philo, 2016; Plumwood, 2002a). Important threads of marginalisation and solidarity emerge between subjectivities that have been rendered less-than-human, however, creating space for empathetic common ground.…”