Autocracy, Elections, and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from Malaysia

Abstract

Authoritarian regimes often use fiscal policy to reward political supporters and to punish political opponents. In many authoritarian regimes with political institutions like parties, legislatures, and elections, elections become a focal point for budget expenditures and the distribution of government patronage. A time-series analysis of Malaysian fiscal expenditures from 1967 to 1997 shows that the ruling coalition systematically increases federal government spending before elections. In addition to marshalling private resources to distribute patronage, the Malaysian government manipulates the government's official position. These findings have important implications for the growing literature on political institutions under autocratic regimes and the politics of patronage and redistribution in the developing world. They also suggest a new empirical domain for existing theories of political business cycles.

Patronage, District Creation, and Reform in Uganda

“…Indeed, the increasing number of new districts, coupled with Museveni_s diminishing electoral support over the years, fits in well with the literature on patronage that suggests the more vulnerable an incumbent politician is, the more likely he/she is to rely upon patronage to win votes (Stein and Bickers 1994). This literature also suggests that politicians in states with competitive elections are likely to allocate patronage at election time in what are termed "political business cycles" (Block 2002;Pepinsky 2007), and again, the evidence from Uganda fits the theory very well. …”

Federalism, gubernatorial power and the incorporation of subnational authoritarianism in Russia: A theory-testing empirical inquiry

“…Given the centrality of the notion of cooptation in the contemporary theories of authoritarian institutionalism (Geddes, 2003;Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006), this conclusion contributes to a better understanding of the intrinsic logic of authoritarian political transformations across the globe. While most of the previous studies focused on political parties and legislatures as primary tools of cooptation (Boix and Svolik, 2003;Pepinsky, 2007;Golosov, 2014a), our research demonstrates that a similar role can be played by subnational structures of power. At the same time, the theory of the incorporation of subnational authoritarianism offers a fresh perspective on the complex relationship between electoral authoritarianism and federalism.…”

Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus

“…In a quite intuitive way, in a country where the incumbent is the sole candidate, the probability of losing power is nil and there is therefore no incentive to generate a PBC. Block et al (2003) Malaysia (Pepinsky 2007) and in the Republic of Korea (Soh 1988). The idea is that even in authoritarian systems, political leaders have to be sufficiently popular to avoid contestation and removal.…”