Autonomy and Adaptive Preferences

Colburn, Ben

doi:10.1017/s0953820810000440

Cited by 82 publications

(38 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Furthermore, many argue that challenges to authenticity extend beyond the rare cases discussed by Kraemer; they occur wherever an individual's social, political and cultural context can undermine development of the capacities necessary for its exercise. This may occur via material processes (as when individuals or groups are not afforded the educational resources to develop reasoning skills or the economic resources to assert material independence from the wills of others2) or psychological ones (oppressive situations can lead to the internalisation of such oppression,17 19 or believing that socially-imposed limitations are right, natural or inevitable and adapting one's desires accordingly20). While it is beyond the scope of this essay to argue at length that such factors pose threats to an agent's autonomy, note that they all involve having ends set by an external influence, rather than the agent's setting such ends for themselves through practical reason or ‘expressing their own nature’; they thus appear to compromise Kantian humanity and Millian character.…”

Section: Relational Insightsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Authenticity and autonomy in deep-brain stimulation

Wardrope

2013

J Med Ethics

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Felicitas Kraemer draws on the experiences of patients undergoing deep-brain stimulation (DBS) to propose two distinct and potentially conflicting principles of respect: for an individual's autonomy (interpreted as mental competence), and for their authenticity. I argue instead that, according to commonly-invoked justifications of respect for autonomy, authenticity is itself in part constitutive of an analysis of autonomy worthy of respect; Kraemer's argument thus highlights the shortcomings of practical applications of respect for autonomy that emphasise competence while neglecting other important dimensions of autonomy such as authenticity, since it shows that competence alone cannot be interpreted as a reliable indicator of an individual's capacity for exercising autonomy. I draw from relational accounts to suggest how respect for a more expansive conception of autonomy might be interpreted for individuals undergoing DBS and in general.

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Section: Relational Insightsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Authenticity and autonomy in deep-brain stimulation

Wardrope

2013

J Med Ethics

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“…(Harris 2014, 249) Acknowledging that Harris interprets the value of freedom in this way suggests the following reading of the freedom to fall objection. 6 First, it suggests how we might understand the apparently contradictory remarks that Harris makes with regards to moral praiseworthiness, virtue, 4 Furthermore if an agent believes that they have extremely limited freedoms then this may have deleterious effects on their freedom of choice, by virtue of the phenomenon of adaptive preference formation (Colburn 2011). This might explain the plausibility of the claim that the Ludovico technique infringes Alex's freedom of choice in some sense, (but in a less direct manner than other commentators have suggested).…”

Section: An Aristotelian Reading Of the Freedom To Fallmentioning

confidence: 99%

Moral Bio-enhancement, Freedom, Value and the Parity Principle

Pugh

2017

Topoi

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A prominent objection to non-cognitive moral bio-enhancements (NCMBEs) is that they would compromise the recipient’s ‘freedom to fall’. I begin by discussing some ambiguities in this objection, before outlining an Aristotelian reading of it. I suggest that this reading may help to forestall Persson and Savulescu’s ‘God-Machine’ criticism; however, I suggest that the objection still faces the problem of explaining why the value of moral conformity is insufficient to outweigh the value of the freedom to fall itself. I also question whether the objection is compatible with Neil Levy’s parity principle. Accordingly, I go on to consider an alternative relational freedom-based objection to NCMBEs that aims to explain the fundamental moral importance of the freedom that NCMBEs would violate. I argue that although this strategy might allow the critic of NCMBEs to bypass a powerful criticism of Harris’ objection, it also weakens the freedom-based objection’s compatibility with the parity principle.

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“…In philosophical discussion of autonomy, this has, nevertheless, been a common topic (e.g. Christman, 2004;Colburn, 2011).…”

Section: Relational Aspects Of Choicementioning

confidence: 99%

Towards a ‘Sociorelational’ Approach to Conceptualizing and Managing Addiction

Eijk

Uusitalo

2016

Public Health Ethics

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This article looks at how and why addiction should be understood as a 'sociorelational' (social and relational) disorder, and what this implies on a policy level in terms of the treatment and prevention of addiction. In light of scientific research, we argue that the neurobiological changes that underlie addiction are heavily influenced by sociorelational processes. We thereby advocate for a conceptual approach in which autonomy in addiction is a sociorelational concept, and social environments are considered autonomy undermining or autonomy promoting. We then discuss the various implications this should have on policies.

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Autonomy and Adaptive Preferences

Cited by 82 publications

References 16 publications

Authenticity and autonomy in deep-brain stimulation

Authenticity and autonomy in deep-brain stimulation

Moral Bio-enhancement, Freedom, Value and the Parity Principle

Towards a ‘Sociorelational’ Approach to Conceptualizing and Managing Addiction

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