Avian influenza overview November 2017 ‐ February 2018

Abstract

Between 16 November 2017 and 15 February 2018, one highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N6) and five HPAI A(H5N8) outbreaks in poultry holdings, two HPAI A(H5N6) outbreaks in captive birds and 22 HPAI A(H5N6) wild bird events were reported within Europe. There is a lower incursion of HPAI A(H5N6) in poultry compared to HPAI A(H5N8). There is no evidence to date that HPAI A(H5N6) viruses circulating in Europe are associated with clades infecting humans. Clinical signs in ducks infected with HPAI A(H5N8) seemed to be decreasing, based on reports from Bulgaria. However, HPAI A(H5N8) is still present in Europe and is widespread in neighbouring areas. The majority of mortality events of wild birds from HPAIV A(H5) in this three‐month period involved single birds. This indicates that the investigation of events involving single dead birds of target species is important for comprehensive passive surveillance for HPAI A(H5). Moreover, 20 low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) outbreaks were reported in three Member States. The risk of zoonotic transmission to the general public in Europe is considered to be very low. The first human case due to avian influenza A(H7N4) was notified in China underlining the threat that newly emerging avian influenza viruses pose for transmission to humans. Close monitoring is required of the situation in Africa and the Middle East with regards to HPAI A(H5N1) and A(H5N8). Uncontrolled spread of virus and subsequent further genetic evolution in regions geographically connected to Europe may increase uncertainty and risk for further dissemination of virus. The risk of HPAI introduction from Third countries via migratory wild birds to Europe is still considered much lower for wild birds crossing the southern borders compared to birds crossing the north‐eastern borders, whereas the introduction via trade is still very to extremely unlikely.

Estimation of the number of exposed people during highly pathogenic avian influenza virus outbreaks in EU/EEA countries, October 2016–September 2018

“…The data provided might also be useful for the countries to better prepare in terms of staff and resources needed for a response in the future particularly when large HPAI outbreaks occur during seasonal influenza epidemics. Although the currently detected avian influenza viruses might have a low risk of transmission (EFSA et al, ; Grund et al, ), it cannot be excluded that viruses with higher zoonotic potential might be introduced into Europe in the future. In such a case, it is necessary to identify those at risk for early intervention and control measures as well as to collect detailed information on the duration and level of exposure as well as protection measures for better evidence generation.…”

Reporting Avian Influenza surveillance

“…If data were to be provided at an establishment level, then the field ‘Poultry Production Categories’ could be divided into two separate fields: ‘Species’ and ‘Production category’ (the categories within these two fields will be described in a ‘Data Dictionary’ that will be circulated with the initial data model for the AI surveillance data collection). Although these two fields would be ‘new’ in the surveillance data set, they are already used to report HPAI poultry outbreaks to EFSA as reflected in the monitoring reports produced by EFSA (EFSA, ). Having the same fields in both data sets would ensure that epidemiological analysis could integrate data from, active surveillance, and passive surveillance (outbreak reports), helping to achieve outcome a) in Section 2.…”

Avian influenza overview August – November 2018

“…Domestic and wild birdsDetectionAs mentioned in previous reports(EFSA et al, 2018b;EFSA et al, 2018c), A(H9N2) is the most commonly detected non-notifiable subtype of influenza viruses in poultry in Asia, the Middle East and North Africa(Bonfante et al, 2018;Chrzastek et al, 2018;Xu et al, 2018; Zhu et al, 2018). This has also reduced the human exposure to the virus and no human cases have been reported since March 2018 (Zeng et al, 2018).4.4.5.…”

“…Routine laboratory diagnostics were described in the EFSA report November 2017 -February 2018(EFSA et al, 2018c). All influenza A virus isolates or clinical samples that cannot be subtyped are to be submitted to the appropriate national reference laboratory (National Influenza Centres; NICs), and to a WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference and Research on Influenza for characterisation(WHO, 2017).…”