2010
DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2010.07.002
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Avoiding commercial piracy

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Cited by 20 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…That is because the second can hardly confront piracy delaying the launching of the product, while the first can do it through price strategies. In markets in which the cost of monitoring piracy through the government is higher than the gross social benefit, it does not have the incentives to combat piracy in a dedicated manner, nor does it prevent the company from becoming monopolistic (Sánchez 2010). Therefore, the enterprise must focus not only on the government's attitude, but also in their own price strategies in order to avoid the entrance of pirates in the market.…”
Section: Literature Revisionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…That is because the second can hardly confront piracy delaying the launching of the product, while the first can do it through price strategies. In markets in which the cost of monitoring piracy through the government is higher than the gross social benefit, it does not have the incentives to combat piracy in a dedicated manner, nor does it prevent the company from becoming monopolistic (Sánchez 2010). Therefore, the enterprise must focus not only on the government's attitude, but also in their own price strategies in order to avoid the entrance of pirates in the market.…”
Section: Literature Revisionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Following Banerjee (2003) and Martínez‐Sánchez (2010), we consider that if the pirate is detected, which occurs with probability he must pay a penalty and he loses his income. Thus, the expected profit of the pirate, taking into account that detection takes place after sale, is: where G e =α G is the expected penalty that the pirate faces.…”
Section: Commercial Piracymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Unlike Martínez‐Sánchez (2010), we consider that the expected penalty is higher when the pirate launches the copy on the market first, i.e. This is because when only the illegal copy is on the market, the probability of the pirate being detected is higher and the penalty that the pirate faces can be larger.…”
Section: Commercial Piracymentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…For an analysis of the role of expectations in network markets, seeGriva and Vettas (2011). 6 SeeTsai and Chiou (2012),Martínez-Sánchez (2010) andBanerjee (2003). 7 Empirical studies of counterfeiting in these markets find that piracy rates vary substantially across countries.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%