Avoiding Obligation

Abstract

This article examines the decisions of governments to enter reservations upon ratification of international human rights treaties. I argue that, in the context of the human rights regime, reservations are simply attempts to avoid international legal obligations where they would be consequential. I develop an explanation for their use that focuses on the following two factors: the legal constraints that already exist in domestic law and the likelihood that international agreements will be enforced by domestic courts. Using an original measure of domestic legal protection of civil, political, and personal integrity rights, I find evidence that governments are more likely to enter reservations when domestic legal standards are lax compared to those in the treaty and when judiciaries are likely to enforce treaty-based obligations. This suggests that full adoption of international human rights treaties is more likely when treaties will not create genuine domestic legal constraints and that explanations for treaty adoption and implementation must take reservations into account. It also suggests that adoption of international human rights law is best explained by the specific legal institutions that relate to domestic enforcement rather than broad distinctions between democratic/autocratic political institutions.

Social Pressure in the International Human Rights Regime: Why States Withdraw Treaty Reservations

“…However, we are confident that the risk of bias arising from this form of selection is minimal. Multiple analysts studying the determinants of reservations fail to uncover bias induced by membership selection (Hill 2016; Zvobgo, Sandholtz, and Mulesky 2020). Moreover, by the end of the analysis period, the sample of treaties enjoyed membership from the vast majority of states.…”

“…We include Demanding Treaty Provision and Non-derogable Treaty Provision , expecting that states are driven by higher costs of compliance to make reservations to these provisions. Similarly, states with higher levels of judicial independence may face higher compliance costs because officials within these countries are more likely to be held accountable by domestic courts for failing to comply with some part of the treaty (Hill 2016; Powell and Staton 2009). We include a variable, Judicial Independence , from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project (Coppedge et al 2018).…”

“…States use reservations to modulate their treaty obligations, particularly in the area of human rights (Neumayer 2007) and especially when obligations are demanding (Zvobgo, Sandholtz, and Mulesky 2020). Reservations reduce treaties' effect on state behavior by limiting executives' legal exposure under a treaty (McKibben and Western 2020), keeping domestic standards low and undercutting judiciaries that would uphold international standards (Hill 2016). Islamic law countries (McKibben and Western 2020; Simmons 2009) and common law countries (McKibben and Western 2020; Simmons 2009; Zvobgo, Sandholtz, and Mulesky 2020) are also more likely to enter reservations than civil law countries 1…”

Authoritarian Institutions and State Repression

“…The study of state repression in autocracies has received considerable attention in comparative politics and international relations over the last decade (see, e.g., Davenport 2007a;Vreeland 2008;Powell and Staton 2009;Conrad 2014;Frantz and Kendall-Taylor 2014;Hill 2015;Bove, Platteau, and Sekeris 2015). Prominent explanations emphasize differences between types of nondemocratic regimes to explain why some states are more repressive than others (Davenport 2007a).…”