Avoiding or restricting defectors in public goods games?

Pereira, Lúıs Moniz; Lenaerts, Tom

doi:10.1098/rsif.2014.1203

Cited by 66 publications

(59 citation statements)

References 48 publications

(91 reference statements)

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“…We consider here symmetrical games (e.g. the public goods games and their generalizations [24,26,43,40,21]) in which the order of the participants is irrelevant. Let α i0 i1,...,i d−1 be the payoff of the focal player, where i 0 (1 ≤ i 0 ≤ n) is the strategy of the focal player, and i k (with 1 ≤ i k ≤ n and 1 ≤ k ≤ d − 1) be the strategy of the player in position k. These payoffs form a (d − 1)-dimensional payoff matrix [16], which satisfies (because of the game symmetry)…”

Section: Replicator Dynamicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of the expected density of internal equilibria in random evolutionary multi-player multi-strategy games

Duong

2016

J. Math. Biol.

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In this paper, we study the distribution and behaviour of internal equilibria in a d-player n-strategy random evolutionary game where the game payoff matrix is generated from normal distributions. The study of this paper reveals and exploits interesting connections between evolutionary game theory and random polynomial theory. The main contributions of the paper are some qualitative and quantitative results on the expected density, f n,d , and the expected number, E(n, d), of (stable) internal equilibria. Firstly, we show that in multi-player two-strategy games, they behave asymptotically as √ d − 1 as d is sufficiently large. Secondly, we prove that they are monotone functions of d. We also make a conjecture for games with more than two strategies. Thirdly, we provide numerical simulations for our analytical results and to support the conjecture. As consequences of our analysis, some qualitative and quantitative results on the distribution of zeros of a random Bernstein polynomial are also obtained.

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Section: Replicator Dynamicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of the expected density of internal equilibria in random evolutionary multi-player multi-strategy games

Duong

2016

J. Math. Biol.

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“…However, some sort of prior expression of interest on behalf of the agents would be indeed needed in reality for initiating the whole process of reaching semantic agreement. Note that, in our case, non-contributors (i.e., those that do not adopt or advertise partial mappings) are self-restricted from accessing the public good, i.e., they cannot free-ride, because each agent constructs the public good locally through some costly effort, as opposed to the work in [18,20].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The purpose of that work is to discourage various free-riding strategies either by avoiding playing the game with free-riders or by restricting access to the public good for freeriders. As compared to [18,20], we do not consider prior commitment of agents for contributing to the public good, as such a setting often requires monetary transfers among agents. However, some sort of prior expression of interest on behalf of the agents would be indeed needed in reality for initiating the whole process of reaching semantic agreement.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As an important instance, they are not concerned with the heterogeneous motivations of individual participants (in terms of their cost and benefit) for being involved in the emergence process of establishing interoperability. Also, [18,20] aim to improve the odds for the implementation of the public good through some form of commitment (which is costly when it is fake) or deposit on behalf of the agents prior to the public good game. The purpose of that work is to discourage various free-riding strategies either by avoiding playing the game with free-riders or by restricting access to the public good for freeriders.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

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On the emergence of semantic agreement among rational agents

Vakili

Papaioannou

Aberer

2015

WEB

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Abstract. Today's complex online applications often require the interaction of multiple (web) services that belong to potentially different business entities. Interoperability is a core element of such an environment, yet not a straightforward one due to the lack of common data semantics. The problem is often approached by means of standardization procedures in a top-down manner with limited adoption in practice. (De facto) standards for semantic interoperability most commonly emerge in a bottom-up approach, i.e., involving the interaction and information exchange among self-interested industrial agents. In this paper, we argue that the emergence of semantic interoperability can be seen as an economic process among rational agents and, although interoperability can be mutually beneficial for the involved parties, it may also be costly and might fail to emerge. As a sample scenario, we consider the emergence of semantic interoperability among rational web service agents in service-oriented architectures (SOAs), and we analyze their individual economic incentives with respect to utility, risk and cost. We model this process as a positive-sum game and study its equilibrium and evolutionary dynamics. According to our analysis, which is also experimentally verified, certain conditions on the communication cost, the cost of technological adaptation, the expected mutual benefit from interoperability, as well as the expected loss from isolation, drive the process.

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“…On the one hand, commitment is one of the most practical tools for maintaining social interactions and takes diverse forms (e.g., from a promise to a deposit and mortgage). Game-theoretical studies have shown that costly commitment can promote the evolution of cooperation in the context of the prisoner's dilemma [4][5][6][7][8]. This widely-studied commitment strategy works in a peer-to-peer fashion by allowing a personal proposer to ask his/her co-player to commit to cooperation, but also enforcing compensation if those who commit defect at a later stage.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Commitment to Cooperation and Peer Punishment: Its Evolution

Sasaki

Okada

Uchida³

et al. 2015

Games

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Theoretical and empirical studies have generally weighed the effect of peer punishment and pool punishment for sanctioning free riders separately. However, these sanctioning mechanisms often pose a puzzling tradeoff between efficiency and stability in detecting and punishing free riders. Here, we combine the key aspects of these qualitatively different mechanisms in terms of evolutionary game theory. Based on the dilemmatic donation game, we introduce a strategy of commitment to both cooperation and peer punishment. To make the commitment credible, we assume that those willing to commit have to make a certain deposit. The deposit will be refunded as long as the committers faithfully cooperate in the donation game and punish free riders and non-committers. It turns out that the deposit-based commitment offers both the efficiency of peer punishment and the stability of pool punishment and that the replicator dynamics lead to transitions of different systems: pool punishment to commitment to peer punishment.

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Avoiding or restricting defectors in public goods games?

Cited by 66 publications

References 48 publications

Analysis of the expected density of internal equilibria in random evolutionary multi-player multi-strategy games

Analysis of the expected density of internal equilibria in random evolutionary multi-player multi-strategy games

On the emergence of semantic agreement among rational agents

Commitment to Cooperation and Peer Punishment: Its Evolution

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