Commitment to Cooperation and Peer Punishment: Its Evolution

Sasaki, Tatsuya; Okada, Isamu; Uchida, S.; Chen, Xiaojie

doi:10.3390/g6040574

Cited by 39 publications

(36 citation statements)

References 43 publications

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“…The problem of explaining the emergence of collective behavior has been studied extensively from a wide range of research fields, including Anthropology, Sociology, Economics, Evolutionary Biology, Psychology, and, more recently, Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Multiagent Systems (MAS) [1,3,16,17,20,22,24,29,33,37,41,46,50,54,69,71]. The PGG is a standard framework to study this problem, as it captures the tension between the benefit of mutual cooperation and the temptation to exploit the efforts of others in a joint venture [13,31,43,49,56,70].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Another commitment experiment [10] takes the form of a deposit and refund scheme [50]: In this scheme, players that agree to commit have to deposit an amount which will be refunded only if they honor the commitment and contribute to the common good. The main difference with our analysis is that the agreement is set up exogenously by a third party instead of being implemented as a strategic behavior (i.e.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Evolution of commitment and level of participation in public goods games

Pereira

Lenaerts

2016

Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst

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Before engaging in a group venture agents may require commitments from other members in the group, and based on the level of acceptance (participation) they can then decide whether it is worthwhile joining the group effort. Here, we show in the context of public goods games and using stochastic evolutionary game theory modelling, which implies imitation and mutation dynamics, that arranging prior commitments while imposing a minimal participation when interacting in groups induces agents to behave cooperatively. Our analytical and numerical results show that if the cost of arranging the commitment is sufficiently small compared to the cost of cooperation, commitment arranging behavior is frequent, leading to a high level of cooperation in the population. Moreover, an optimal participation level emerges depending both on the dilemma at stake and on the cost of arranging the commitment. Namely, the harsher the common good dilemma is, and the costlier it becomes to arrange the commitment, the more participants should explicitly commit to the agreement to ensure the success of the joint venture. Furthermore, considering that commitment deals may last for more than one encounter, we show that commitment proposers can be lenient in case of short-term agreements, yet should be strict in case of long-term interactions. B The Anh Han

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolution of commitment and level of participation in public goods games

Pereira

Lenaerts

2016

Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst

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“…It can be understood such that players make a commitment before the game is actually played. Recently, a series of papers analyzed the effect of such pre-commitments on evolution of cooperation (Han et al, 2013(Han et al, , 2015a(Han et al, ,b, 2017aSasaki et al, 2015;Han and Lenaerts, 2016) and found that pre-commitments were effective in enhancing cooperation. Those works typically assume that players can choose whether they make a costly commitment before the game.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Dynamics of Coordinated Cooperation

Ohtsuki

2018

Front. Ecol. Evol.

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In social evolution theory, unconditional cooperation has been seen as an evolutionarily unsuccessful strategy unless there is a mechanism that promotes positive assortment between like individuals. One such example is kin selection, where individuals sharing common ancestry and therefore having the same strategy are more likely to interact with each other. Conditional cooperation, on the other hand, can be successful if interactions with the same partners last long. In many previous models, it has been assumed that individuals act conditionally on the past behavior of others. Here I propose a new model of conditional cooperation, namely the model of coordinated cooperation. Coordinated cooperation means that there is a negotiation before an actual game is played, and that each individual can flexibly change their decision, either to cooperation or to defection, according to the number of those who show the intention of cooperation/defection. A notable feature of my model is that individuals play an actual game only once but can still use conditional strategies. Since such a negotiation is cognitively demanding, the target of my model here is exclusively human behavior. I have analyzed cultural evolutionary dynamics of conditional strategies in this framework. Results for an infinitely large population show that conditional cooperation not only works as a catalyst for the evolution of cooperation, but sustains a polymorphic attractor with unconditional cooperators, unconditional defectors, and conditional cooperators being present. A finite population analysis is also performed. Overall, my results provide one explanation of why people tend to take into account others' decisions even when doing so gives them no payoff consequences at all.

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“…Hence, this poses a second---order free rider problem-freeloading on others' efforts in making responsible punishment or assessments undermines the equilibrium of Punishers and Discriminators [44,64]. To address this problem, some solutions have been presented to date such as pool punishment with second---order punishment [65] and the punitive deposit system [66,67]. In indirect reciprocity, Sasaki and colleagues recently explored pre---assessment systems to detect second---order free riders [45].…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Evolution of Reputation-Based Cooperation in Regular Networks

Sasaki

Yamamoto

Okada

et al. 2017

Games

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Despite recent advances in reputation technologies, it is not clear how reputation systems can affect human cooperation in social networks. Although it is known that two of the major mechanisms in the evolution of cooperation are spatial selection and reputation-based reciprocity, theoretical study of the interplay between both mechanisms remains almost uncharted.Here, we present a new individual-based model for the evolution of reciprocal cooperation between reputation and networks. We comparatively analyze four of the leading moral assessment rules-shunning, image scoring, stern judging, and simple standing-and base the model on the giving game in regular networks for Cooperators, Defectors, and Discriminators. Discriminators rely on a proper moral assessment rule. By using individual-based models, we show that the four assessment rules are differently characterized in terms of how cooperation evolves, depending on the benefit-to-cost ratio, the network-node degree, and the observation and error conditions. Our findings show that the most tolerant rule-simple standing-is the most robust among the four assessment rules in promoting cooperation in regular networks.

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Commitment to Cooperation and Peer Punishment: Its Evolution

Cited by 39 publications

References 43 publications

Evolution of commitment and level of participation in public goods games

Evolution of commitment and level of participation in public goods games

Evolutionary Dynamics of Coordinated Cooperation

The Evolution of Reputation-Based Cooperation in Regular Networks

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