2007
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.12.001
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Bad news can be good news: Early dropouts in an English auction with multi-dimensional signals

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Cited by 4 publications
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“…10 The intuition is that an agent has no information about the signals observed by other agents and so the impact of the signals on the agent's payoff is a sufficient statistic of all the information this agent observes. Provided the signals are independently distributed, this approach can also be used in many other mechanisms-including a first-price auction and an ascending auction (see Goeree and Offerman (2003) or Levin, Peck, and Ye (2007)). We discuss the assumption of independent signals after we provide the information structure in our model (in Footnote 12).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…10 The intuition is that an agent has no information about the signals observed by other agents and so the impact of the signals on the agent's payoff is a sufficient statistic of all the information this agent observes. Provided the signals are independently distributed, this approach can also be used in many other mechanisms-including a first-price auction and an ascending auction (see Goeree and Offerman (2003) or Levin, Peck, and Ye (2007)). We discuss the assumption of independent signals after we provide the information structure in our model (in Footnote 12).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%