Ballot Structure and Satisfaction with Democracy

Abstract

This paper analyzes the influence of ballot structure over satisfaction with democracy. In line with previous literature, we hypothesize that some ballot structures -such as preferential ballots -generate more satisfaction with democracy than closed ones. Yet, we expect these differences to be especially relevant among the more knowledgeable electorate, since any open ballot structure requires more sophisticated voters. Using CSES surveys, our results do not show a clear and parsimonious relation between ballot openness and satisfaction with democracy as some previous research seems to suggest. Our findings rather suggest that is preferential ballots and open lists the only ballot structures that generate more satisfaction than most of the remaining ballot structures. Yet, this relation is restricted only among the more knowledgeable electorate. The liberty of choice that ballot structure offers only concerns a reduced portion of the electorate, namely the more politically sophisticated one.

Voting and satisfaction with democracy in flexible-list PR

“…The first study on the topic by Farrell and McAllister (2006) found that levels of satisfaction with democracy tended to be higher in list PR systems allowing voters to cast votes for candidates. Yet, Bosch and Orriols (2014), re-analysing the same dataset, show that satisfaction is only higher in the systems in which the rank ordering of candidates has no impact on which candidates are elected.…”

“…However, cross-sectional studies find mixed evidence regarding the effect of ballot structure on people's satisfaction with democracy. Levels are often similar in closed-list and flexible-list PR systems (Bosch and Orriols, 2014). However, prior research has only examined aggregate levels of satisfaction with democracy.…”

Key electoral institutions and rules influencing proportionality and partisan bias in Spanish politics

“…That current electoral institutions, as well as some alternative ones if reforms were implemented, are not neutral is a statement that can be easily found in the literature (Benoit, 2000). This is a valid statement concerning the conversion formula as well as regarding the ballot structure (Bosch and Orriols, 2014). This also concerns the impact different electoral rules may exercise upon the formation or not of pre-electoral coalitions (Golder, 2006, Spoon et al 2015, or the influence different rules may exercise on the number of political parties that enter a legislature, to mention but a few areas of research of this literature.…”

The Effect of Parties on Voters’ Satisfaction with Democracy

“…This modifying effect of the electoral system on the satisfaction gap presented by Anderson and Guillory (1997) has found supportive (e.g., Farrell & McAllister, 2006;Klingemann, 1999), albeit mixed evidence (e.g., Aarts & Thomassen, 2008;Berggren, Fugate, Preuhs, & Still, 2004;McAllister, 2005). The latter studies pointed towards other factors possibly influencing the winnerloser gap, such as economic inequality (Han & Chang, 2016), voters' degree of control over the resulting political representation (Bosch & Orriols, 2014;Pellegata & Memoli, 2018), ideological proximity (Curini et al, 2012;Ezrow & Xezonakis, 2011), the intertemporal dimension of winning (Chang, Chu, & Wu, 2014), strategic voting (Singh, 2014), the availability of direct political participation for losers (Bernauer & Vatter, 2012), and electoral margins (Howell & Justwan, 2013).…”