Bargaining Constitutional Design in Italy: Judicial Review as Political Insurance

Volcansek, Mary L.

doi:10.1080/01402380903538906

Cited by 28 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 19 publications

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“…Third, a neglected consequence of the elite's insurance policy (Ginsburg, 2003) is that the minority (hegemonic) elite in government does not escape the rules of their own making. The minority elite, while they may have wanted constitutional review as insurance against their loss of power, very likely retreat from horizontal accountability once they achieve power (Volcansek, 2010). However, Turkey's established Constitutional Court did not overlook executive transgressions by the minority elite.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hegemonic preservation or horizontal accountability: constitutional review in Turkey

Hazama¹

2011

International Political Science Review

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Does constitutional review in emerging democracies tend to enhance horizontal accountability or to preserve state-elite hegemony? The results of a quantitative analysis of abstract constitutional review in Turkey during the 1984-2007 period show: (1) that the Constitutional Court was no more likely to accept unconstitutionality claims by state-elite parties than by non-state-elite parties; and (2) that the Constitutional Court was more likely to accept unconstitutionality claims of executive transgressions than those of stateprinciples violations. In sum, the findings largely point to the Constitutional Court's preference for horizontal accountability over hegemonic preservation.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%