Bargaining Power in Multilateral Negotiations on Intellectual Property Rules: Paradox of Weakness

Abstract

This article critically analyses the effects of differing bargaining powers between developed and developing countries during international negotiations on intellectual property (IP) rights. While developed countries with stronger bargaining power have the capacity to shape the international IP law in accordance with their interests, developing states are not powerless. Developing countries can gain some concessions by forming coalitions. Additionally, they can achieve their goals by means of a ''paradox of weakness'', a concept derived from international conflict resolution. The article elaborates how the paradox is applied in the context of adoption and implementation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 1994.

Rising Powers and Multilateral Institutions

“…We hypothesize, in other words, that rising powers are pulled too much between stable institutions and changing material interests to lead in any direction. This behavior would be consistent with the observation found in earlier studies that, in multilateral negotiations over IP, the most influential countries and coalition leaders, both in favor and against strong IP protection, tend to have their domestic institutions aligned with their interests (Benoliel and Salama, 2010;Sell, 2010;Karayanidi, 2011). 3 Our second question pertains to the causal dynamics at play from the time a country resists foreign IP standards to the time it promotes strong international IP protection.…”