Becoming Cognitive Science

Abstract

Cognitive science continues to make a compelling case for having a coherent, unique, and fundamental subject of inquiry: What is the nature of minds, where do they come from, and how do they work? Central to this inquiry is the notion of agents that have goals, one of which is their own persistence, who use dynamically constructed knowledge to act in the world to achieve those goals. An agentive perspective explains why a special class of systems have a cluster of co‐occurring capacities that enable them to exhibit adaptive behavior in a complex environment: perception, attention, memory, representation, planning, and communication. As an intellectual endeavor, cognitive science may not have achieved a hard core of uncontested assumptions that Lakatos (1978) identifies as emblematic of a successful research program, but there are alternative conceptions according to which cognitive science has been successful. First, challenges of the early, core tenet of “Mind as Computation” have helped put cognitive science on a stronger foundation—one that incorporates relations between minds and their environments. Second, even if a full cross‐disciplinary theoretic consensus is elusive, cognitive science can inspire distant, deep, and transformative connections between pairs of fields. To be intellectually vital, cognitive science need not resemble a traditional discipline with its associated insularity and unchallenged assumptions. Instead, there is strength and resilience in the diverse perspectives and methods that cognitive science assembles together. This interdisciplinary enterprise is fragile and perhaps inherently unstable, as the looming absorption of cognitive science into psychology shows. Still, for many researchers, the excitement and benefits of triangulating on the nature of minds by integrating diverse cases cannot be secured by a stable discipline with an uncontested core of assumptions.

For the Sciences They Are A‐Changin’: A Response to Commentaries on Núñez et al.’s (2019) “What Happened to Cognitive Science?”

“…Indeed, classic examples of healthy interdisciplinary integration are often cases that only involve two disciplines—biochemistry, psycholinguistics, biological anthropology, to mention a few. Consistent with this, Goldstone (2019) observes that “even if full cross‐disciplinary theoretic consensus is elusive, cognitive science can inspire … transformative connections between pairs of fields” (p. 902, our emphasis). Perhaps cognitive science’s initial “grand endeavor” was simply too ambitious and, ultimately, impractical.…”

“…But there is more. Several commentators elaborated on the unbalanced participation of the six original disciplines in the field, stressing the marked dominance of (cognitive) psychology (Gentner, 2019; Goel, 2019; Goldstone, 2019; Schunn, 2019). Unbalanced participation constitutes an obstacle to genuine interdisciplinary integration.…”

“…Bender (2019) stresses the value of diversity, and Broude et al (2019) express that “multiplicity of frameworks [is] a sign of vigorous life” (p. 865). Overall, authors value “cross‐pollination of ideas” (McShane et al, 2019, p. 917), cross‐fertilization (Bender, 2019; Goldstone, 2019), and multidisciplinarity as a goal in cognitive science (Gray, 2019). Yes, we wholeheartedly endorse multidisciplinarity.…”

“…Broude et al (2019) agreed with us that “no such core currently exists for cognitive science” (p. 865) and argued for an ideal “integrative approach”: “the simultaneous and conceptually integrated application of theory, methods, and evidence from many participating fields with reference to the same phenomenon” (p. 867). But Goldstone (2019) thinks it is too early to address the issue: “As an intellectual endeavor, cognitive science may not have achieved a hard core of uncontested assumptions” (p. 902) and adds that a “premature convergence on a core would be particularly harmful for cognitive science because our enterprise is much closer to the ‘just getting started’ than ‘moribund decline’ stage of its lifespan” (p. 909). He even questions “the extent to which a uniform disciplinary training across the world’s cognitive science programs is a good thing.…”

“…Results of evaluations, however, are not always easy to digest. Goldstone (2019) is spot on with this. As he put it, “while scientometricians can objectively and dispassionately articulate the case that cognitive science has not matured into a coherent disciplinary field … we who consider ourselves cognitive scientists cannot help but receive this news with emotional reactions ranging across denial, defensiveness, frustration, and dejection” (p. 903).…”