Behavioral and neural constraints on hierarchical representations

Schwartz, Odelia; Giraldo, Luis G. Sánchez

doi:10.1167/17.3.13

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 199 publications

(220 reference statements)

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“…More specific structural dependencies give rise to a “co‐determination” of perceptual states (Gilchrist, 2006; Schwartz & Sanchez Giraldo, 2017). Consider the group of triangles in Figure 8.…”

Section: The Distribution Of Perceptual Statesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Little attention has been paid in the literature to how distributional considerations, which concern what co‐occurrences of mental states are possible, differ from processing considerations, which concern the particular causal and temporal organization of mental states. In fact, it is frequently assumed that structural claims are only explanatory and evaluable in the context of specific models of psychological processes (see, for example, Anderson, 1978; Barsalou, 1990; Dickinson, 2012; Goldstone & Kersten, 2003; Johnson, 2015; Machery, 2009; Palmer, 1978; Schwartz & Sanchez Giraldo, 2017). 17 I suggest, in contrast, that hypotheses about how mental states are structured can explain and predict the distributional properties of those mental states without committing to specific processing models.…”

Section: The Autonomy Of Structural Claimsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Mental structures

Lande

2020

Nous

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An ongoing philosophical discussion concerns how various types of mental states fall within broad representational genera—for example, whether perceptual states are “iconic” or “sentential,” “analog” or “digital,” and so on. Here, I examine the grounds for making much more specific claims about how mental states are structured from constituent parts. For example, the state I am in when I perceive the shape of a mountain ridge may have as constituent parts my representations of the shapes of each peak and saddle of the ridge. More specific structural claims of this sort are a guide to how mental states fall within broader representational kinds. Moreover, these claims have significant implications of their own about semantic, functional, and epistemic features of our mental lives. But what are the conditions on a mental state's having one type of constituent structure rather than another? Drawing on explanatory strategies in vision science, I argue that, other things being equal, the constituent structure of a mental state determines what I call its distributional properties—namely, how mental states of that type can, cannot, or must co‐occur with other mental states in a given system. Distributional properties depend critically on and are informative about the underlying structures of mental states, they abstract in important ways from aspects of how mental states are processed, and they can yield significant insights into the variegation of psychological capacities.

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Section: The Distribution Of Perceptual Statesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Autonomy Of Structural Claimsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mental structures

Lande

2020

Nous

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“…Divisive normalization is already present in simple forms in deep convolutional neural networks (see e.g. references in 37 , 118 ). One would need to extend such models to incorporate adaptation in time.…”

Section: Adaptation To Natural Scenesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Adaptation in the visual cortex: a case for probing neuronal populations with natural stimuli

2017

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The perception of, and neural responses to, sensory stimuli in the present are influenced by what has been observed in the past—a phenomenon known as adaptation. We focus on adaptation in visual cortical neurons as a paradigmatic example. We review recent work that represents two shifts in the way we study adaptation, namely (i) going beyond single neurons to study adaptation in populations of neurons and (ii) going beyond simple stimuli to study adaptation to natural stimuli. We suggest that efforts in these two directions, through a closer integration of experimental and modeling approaches, will enable a more complete understanding of cortical processing in natural environments.

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Compositionality in perception: A framework

Lande

2024

WIRES Cognitive Science

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Perception involves the processing of content or information about the world. In what form is this content represented? I argue that perception is widely compositional. The perceptual system represents many stimulus features (including shape, orientation, and motion) in terms of combinations of other features (such as shape parts, slant and tilt, common and residual motion vectors). But compositionality can take a variety of forms. The ways in which perceptual representations compose are markedly different from the ways in which sentences or thoughts are thought to be composed. I suggest that the thesis that perception is compositional is not itself a concrete hypothesis with specific predictions; rather it affords a productive framework for developing and evaluating specific empirical hypotheses about the form and content of perceptual representations. The question is not just whether perception is compositional, but how. Answering this latter question can provide fundamental insights into perception.This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Representation Philosophy > Foundations of Cognitive Science Psychology > Perception and Psychophysics

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Behavioral and neural constraints on hierarchical representations

Cited by 4 publications

References 199 publications

Mental structures

Mental structures

Adaptation in the visual cortex: a case for probing neuronal populations with natural stimuli

Compositionality in perception: A framework

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