Behavioral Norms: Variants and Their Identification

Abstract

Behavioral norms influence human interaction in virtually every situation, yet the study of norms in the behavioral sciences lags relative to their real‐world power and significance. We describe basic distinctions in norms emerging in the behavioral and social sciences – in particular, how norms may be descriptive (i.e,, what people commonly do) versus injunctive (i.e,, what people should do), and social (i.e,, beliefs about what other people think one should do) versus moral (i.e,, what one privately thinks one should do). We further describe empirical methods that researchers can use to examine whether any particular behavior is inspired by norms and which variant might be responsible. We end by describing emerging findings and questions in recent work on norms. Thus, the purpose of this review is to attempt to organize scholarship about norms for social and personality psychology, in the hope that it may foster empirical investigation of norm‐driven behavior and thus build connections to other behavioral sciences.

Mapping the Social-Norms Literature: An Overview of Reviews

“…Social norms are also not simple behavioral regularities in groups of people (Bicchieri, Muldoon, & Sontuoso, 2011). Some behavioral regularities can be attributed to norms, whereas others may be the result of nonnormative factors (J. E. Anderson & Dunning, 2014; Bell & Cox, 2015; Dannals & Miller, 2017; Etzioni, 2000).…”

Should Versus Want: On the Relative Contribution of Injunctive Norms and Preferences on Trust Decisions

“…Following Dunning et al (), we added the instruction “Sometimes, what people should do and what they want to do lead to the same decision, sometimes they lead to different decisions” (translated into German). The amount individuals want to entrust can thus be interpreted in terms of a preference for trust; the amount individuals think they should entrust can be taken to reflect normative concerns (Anderson and Dunning, ), particularly referring to individuals' judgment of what is socially appropriate, polite, and respectful (rather than what is individually logical or rational; Schlösser, Mensching, Dunning, and Fetchenhauer, ). In turn, the actual do ‐trust behavior will be some mixture of preferences, normative judgments, and other factors—each of which may be weighted more or less strongly (in the extreme, a single factor may drive the do‐trust behavior in a non‐compensatory manner).…”

“…Correspondingly, it has recently been argued—and supported in a series of different experiments—that people trust “excessively” because of the power of injunctive norms (Dunning, Anderson, Schlösser, Ehlebracht, and Fetchenhauer, ). By definition, “injunctive norms are those that drive behavior through a feeling that one ‘should’ or ‘ought’ to act a certain way, and can be differentiated from mere preferences or attitudes—that is, how people might want to behave” (Anderson and Dunning, , p. 724). Regarding the decision to trust, the idea hence is that people trust strangers not because they really want to—that is, based on a preference—but rather because they believe they should, thus primarily adhering to an injunctive norm.…”

Development and Validation of a Circumplex Measure of the Interpersonal Culture in Work Teams and Organizations

“…If the CCS/CTS instead assessed injunctive norms , then the referent would be the perceived attitudes of members of the team or organization toward behaviors from each IPC region. Lacking direct access to others’ attitudes, respondents are prone to infer injunctive norms from descriptive norms (e.g., “if most team members occasionally ridicule others’ contributions, then most team members must approve of that behavior”) (Anderson and Dunning, 2014; Miller and Prentice, 2016). Therefore, when testing and providing feedback to teams and organizations in Study 3, we assessed ideal (rather than injunctive) norms, with the referent being respondents’ own attitudes (rather than others’ attitudes) toward behaviors from each IPC region.…”