In a circular neighborhood of eight, each member contributes repeatedly to two asymmetric (i.e. with different freeriding incentives) local public goods, one with the left and one with the right neighbor. All two-person public good games provide only local feedback information and are structurally independent in spite of their overlapping player sets. Here heterogeneity across neighbors is induced by two randomly selected members, named "Bad" Apples, who are either less productive or excluded from periodic information feedback about their payoffs and neighbors' contributions. Although the presence of both "Bad" Apple types leads to the neighborhood, as a whole, evolving less cooperatively, the way in which it spreads is quite different. While less productive "Bad" Apples directly initiate the spoiling of the basket due to their low contributions, "Bad" Apples excluded from periodic information are exploited by their neighbors. Furthermore, we find evidence that "Bad" Apples' positioning affects contributions in the neighborhood.