Being Proud and Feeling Proud: Character, Emotion, and the Moral Psychology of Personal Ideals

Fischer, Jeremy

doi:10.1007/s10790-012-9337-x

Cited by 4 publications

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“…Other emotion types are forms of agential evaluation. This has been argued to be the case for admiration (Zagzebski 2015(Zagzebski , 2017Kauppinen 2019), for contempt (Mason 2003;Bell 2013), for pride (Fischer 2012;Kauppinen 2017), and for shame (Teroni and Bruun 2011;Carlsson 2019). Admiration and pride respectively apprehend excellence in others and in ourselves, while contempt and shame respectively apprehend others and oneself as falling considerably short of some important standard.…”

Section: Actional and Agential Evaluationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the fittingness of agential evaluations

Keller

2021

Philosophical Explorations

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According to a leading view, emotions such as admiration, contempt, pride, and shame are important vehicles of agential development. Through admiration and contempt, we establish models and countermodels against which to shape our character; through pride and shame, we get a sense of how we measure up to them.Critics of this view object that these emotions always deliver uncompromising evaluations: admiration casts people in a completely positive light, while contempt casts aspersion on them. Therefore, insofar as they lack the capacity for nuance, these emotions are systematically unfitting and misleading. This paper discusses this objection as originally formulated by Doris (2002) as well as Bell's response (2011, 2013). Drawing from research on emotional intentionality, it will be argued that Doris' and Bell's accounts are respectively misguided criticisms and inadequate defences of these emotions. Their mistake lies in an invalid transition from the claim that these emotions are intentionally directed towards persons to the claim that they deliver global evaluations of those towards whom they are directed. By rejecting this inference, it will be shown that these emotions can deliver nuanced and fitting evaluations in a way Doris' objection overlooks and Bell's response precludes us from articulating.

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Section: Actional and Agential Evaluationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the fittingness of agential evaluations

Keller

2021

Philosophical Explorations

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“…There is very little in the philosophical literature about the nature and moral psychology of personal ideals (for insightful general claims about personal ideals, see Anderson [1993]; for a discussion of pride and personal ideals, see Fischer [2012] and see especially Callard [2016]). Velleman's fiction view of personal ideals is promising, but action-by-ideal seems far messier than this and in need of further exploration.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Personal Ideals as Metaphors

Riggle

2017

J. of the Am. Philos. Assoc.

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ABSTRACT:What is it to have and act on a personal ideal? Someone who aspires to be a philosopher might imaginatively think ‘I am a philosopher’ by way of motivating herself to think hard about a philosophical question. But doing so seems to require her to act on an inaccurate self-description, given that she is not yet what she regards herself as being. J. David Velleman develops the thought that action-by-ideal involves a kind of fictional self-conception. My aim is to expand our thinking about personal ideals by developing another way of understanding them. On this view action-by-ideal involves a kind of metaphorical self-conception. I investigate some salient differences between these views with the aim of understanding the different perspectives they take on the rationality of action-by-ideal. Where the fiction view runs into problems of literary coherence, the metaphor view exploits the richness of poetic invention. But action-by-ideal is a complex phenomenon about which there may be no tidy story to be told. This paper is an attempt to clarify and understand more of this messy terrain.

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Remorse and Self-love: Kostelnička’s Change of Heart

Pacovská

2021

J Ethics

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Does remorse imply self-hatred? In this paper, I argue that self-hatred is a false response to one's wrongdoing because it is corrupted by the vice of pride, which affects the perception of its object. To identify the detrimental operation of pride, I propose to study the process of change of heart and its impediments. I use the example of Kostelnička, from Janáček's opera Jenůfa, to show that the impediment to remorse is active already as a source of wrongdoing and self-deception. I identify three different aspects of Kostelnička's pride: social ambition, defensive anger and moral ambition. I show that it is pride as moral ambition that prevents the wrongdoer's acknowledgment of her blameworthiness by causing her obsession with her blameless self-image and corrupting her self-love. In the last part of the paper, I reject Kostelnička's initial self-hatred before her change of heart, because it is not based on an accurate judgement of her agency. Kostelnička's true remorse is thereupon connected with her inner transformation towards humility and with a reorientation of her attention towards the victim of her wrongdoing, as testified in her plea for forgiveness. The implied moral improvement and reconstitution of her relationship to herself and others opens the way for her coming to terms with her guilt.Keywords: guilt feelings and remorse, change of heart, self-deceptive wrongdoing, corrupted self-love, pride and humility, moral ambition 1 Self-hatred thus involves both self-loathing (based on "global" negative evaluation of the person as such) and the corresponding behaviour that damages one's well-being, such as self-torment, destructive behaviour and even suicide. I am following here Aristotle's remarks on hatred (Aristotle 1382a15) as developed by Ben-Ze'ev (2000: 382).

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Being Proud and Feeling Proud: Character, Emotion, and the Moral Psychology of Personal Ideals

Cited by 4 publications

References 0 publications

On the fittingness of agential evaluations

On the fittingness of agential evaluations

Personal Ideals as Metaphors

Remorse and Self-love: Kostelnička’s Change of Heart

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