Having the emotion of pride requires taking oneself to stand in some special relation to the object of pride. According to agency accounts of this pride relation, the self and the object of pride are suitably related just in case one is morally responsible for the existence or excellence of the object of one's pride. I argue that agency accounts fail. This argument provides a strong prima facie defence of an alternate account of pride, according to which the self and the object of pride are suitably related just in case one's relation to the object of pride indicates that one's life accords with some of one's personal ideals. I conclude that the pride relation, though distinct from the relation of moral responsibility, is nonetheless a relation of philosophical interest that merits further attention. 1 . . . the objects which excite these passions [pride and humility], are very numerous, and seemingly very different from each other. Pride or self-esteem may arise from the qualities of the mind; wit, goodsense, learning, courage, integrity: from those of the body;

Drawing on Frederick Douglass's arguments about racial pride, I develop and defend an account of feeling racial pride that centers on resisting racialized oppression. Such pride is racially ecumenical in that it does not imply partiality towards one's own racial group. I argue that it can both accurately represent its intentional object and be intrinsically and extrinsically valuable to experience. It follows, I argue, that there is, under certain conditions, a morally unproblematic, and plausibly valuable, kind of racial pride available to White people, though one that could hardly differ more from what is generally meant by "White pride.

This essay develops a framework for understanding what I call the ethics of reflexivity, that is, the norms that govern attitudes and actions with respect to one's own worth. I distinguish five central aspects of the reflexive commitment to living in accordance with one's personal ideals: (1) the extent to which and manner in which one regards oneself from an evaluative point of view, (2) the extent to which one cares about receiving the respect of others, (3) the degree to which one interprets one's personal ideals in an individualistic or collective manner, (4) the degree to which one's commitment to living in accordance with one's personal ideals is rigid or flexible, and ( 5) the worthiness of one's personal ideals. This framework, I argue, illuminates the nature and moral significance of virtuous and vicious forms of the character trait of pride.

Moralists have long held ambivalent views about pride. On the one hand, pride is commonly considered an appropriate response to achievements, to family, and to country. 1 We sometimes link pride with self-respect in campaigns for social justice, and some philosophers have even asked whether our lives have meaning in terms of ''whether one's life can be seen as a proper source of pride.'' 2 On the other hand, pride is known in 1 See Robert Solomon, The Passions (New York: Doubleday Press, 1976), pp. 344-347; see also Nancy Sherman, ''Aristotle on Friendship and the Shared Life,'' Philosophy and

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