Belief as Question‐Sensitive

Must φ is felicitous only if φ is not known

“…The logical omniscience problem is another example demonstrating that when knowledge of the prejacent fails, epistemic must is felicitous, in line with the epistemic account. As is well known (e.g., Fagin & Halpern 1987, Fagin et al 1995, Yalcin 2016, the logical omniscience problem is a problem in that possible worlds models of epistemic reasoning typically predict agents to immediately know all deductive consequences of their knowledge, but real humans do not display this behavior. For example, consider the outcome for (15) if we apply the possible worlds implementation of the epistemic account proposed by Giannakidou & Mari (2016) in (6).…”

“…The most straightforward way to fix the particular implementation in (6a) is to apply the idea of compartmentalized belief (Stalnaker 1984, discussed also in Lewis 1996 andYalcin 2016): Agents only recognize the logical consequences of certain members of the powerset of Epi, with availability of a set determined in this case by how large it is. Must φ is felicitous only if φ is not entailed by one of the available subsets of Epi.…”

The relationship between belief and credence

“…Others argue that we should give up belief‐consistency—as long as one's credences are rational and one follows the dictates of the Lockean thesis, a rational agent can have contradictory beliefs (Easwaran, 2016; Easwaran & Fitelson, 2015). Third, some argue that rational belief is context‐ or question‐sensitive (e.g., maybe the threshold for rational belief varies with stakes)—endorsing contextualism is one way to maintain both closure and consistency (Kyburg, 1988; Leitgeb, 2013b, 2014a, 2015, 2017; van Fraassen, 1995; Yalcin, 2018). Naked statistical evidence cases warrant a separate response—Lockeans argue that we can rationally form beliefs based on mere statistical evidence (Ahlstrom‐Vij & Dunn, 2014, p. 547; Schmalback, 1986) or that mere statistical evidence is not a basis for rational high credence (Freitag & Zinke, Forthcoming).…”

The Fundamental Problem of Logical Omniscience

“…Our approach is reminiscent of [66]'s work on the topic-sensitivity of belief, and of dynamic epistemic logic [60][61][62]. Yalcin, however, does not present a full-fledged logical system and does not treat propositions as thick.…”