Belief is weak

Hawthorne, John; Rothschild, Daniel; Spectre, Levi

doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0553-7

Cited by 135 publications

(92 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…But it has been defended, to a greater or lesser extent, by some theorists. Some examples include Maher (1986Maher ( , 1993, Kaplan (1998), Christensen (2007), Buchak (2013), Frankish (2004), Fantl and McGrath (2002), Worsnip (2016) and Hawthorne et al (2016). however valuable, against any possible payoff, however insignificant, on the truth of p. Second, it would imply that it would never be rationally permissible to revise one's beliefs: that, once one comes to believe that p, there is no piece of evidence one could ever come to be aware of, no matter the kind or amount, that could rationally allow one to change one's mind on that issue.…”

Section: Belief and Certaintymentioning

confidence: 99%

Requirements of intention in light of belief

Núñez

2019

Philos Stud

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Much work in the philosophy of action in the last few decades has focused on the elucidation and justification of a series of purported norms of practical rationality that concern the presence or absence of intention in light of belief, and that demand a kind of structural coherence in the psychology of an agent. Examples of such norms (all roughly formulated) include: Intention Detachment, which proscribes intending to do something in case some condition obtains, believing that such condition obtains, and not intending to do that thing; Intention-Belief Consistency, which proscribes intending to do what you believe you will not do; Intention Consistency, which proscribes intending each of two ends you believe to be inconsistent; and Means-End Coherence, which proscribes intending an end and not intending the means you believe to be implied by your end. In this paper, I present a series of examples that show that these requirements are not genuine requirements of rationality. The reason for this is simple: these requirements concern the presence or absence of intention in light of all-out belief. Rational agents like us, however, do not, and in fact should not, always form or revise their intentions in light of what they all-out believe. When such agents do not form or revise their intentions in light of what they all-out believe, they need not be irrational if they do not conform to these requirements.

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Section: Belief and Certaintymentioning

confidence: 99%

Requirements of intention in light of belief

Núñez

2019

Philos Stud

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“…As I will understand the notion, outright belief is the sort of attitude adopted when one judges that something is the case or when one takes oneself to know something and which is typically expressed in a direct way by means of assertion: As Williamson (, p. 256) claims, ‘occurrently believing p stands to asserting p as the inner stands to the outer.’ This understanding of the notion is, I think, rather widespread among philosophers, but I do not claim it to correspond in all details to the usage of the term ‘belief’ in ordinary speech. Arguably, ‘belief’ is often used in speech to refer to a weaker attitude, which is compatible with high levels of doubt and which is not properly expressed by unqualified assertions but rather by hedged statements such as ‘I believe it will rain’ or ‘It think it will rain’ (Hawthorne et al ., ). I take it that the stronger attitude I will be concerned with plays a central role in our rational life, in virtue of its connections with assertion, judgment, and agency (see Weisberg, forthcoming; also Clarke, ; Ross and Schroeder, ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…This understanding of the notion is, I think, rather widespread among philosophers, but I do not claim it to correspond in all details to the usage of the term 'belief' in ordinary speech. Arguably, 'belief' is often used in speech to refer to a weaker attitude, which is compatible with high levels of doubt and which is not properly expressed by unqualified assertions but rather by hedged statements such as 'I believe it will rain' or 'It think it will rain' (Hawthorne et al, 2016). I take it that the stronger attitude I will be concerned with plays a central role in our rational life, in virtue of its connections with assertion, judgment, and agency (see Weisberg, forthcoming;also Clarke, 2013;Ross and Schroeder, 2014).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

No Reasons to Believe the False

Salas¹

2019

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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I argue that if there are nondisabled reasons to believe p, then there cannot be nondisabled reasons to believe something incompatible with p. I first defend a restricted version of the view, which applies only to situations where the relevant agent has complete evidence. Then, I argue for a generalized version of the view, which holds regardless of the agent's evidence. As a related result, I show that, given plausible assumptions, there cannot be nondisabled reasons to believe something false.

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“…273–4). However, Hawthorne, Rothschild, and Spectre (2016) argue that the threshold may sometimes be below 0.5.…”

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confidence: 99%

The relationship between belief and credence

Jackson

2020

Philosophy Compass

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Sometimes epistemologists theorize about belief, a tripartite attitude on which one can believe, withhold belief, or disbelieve a proposition. In other cases, epistemologists theorize about credence, a fine‐grained attitude that represents one's subjective probability or confidence level toward a proposition. How do these two attitudes relate to each other? This article explores the relationship between belief and credence in two categories: descriptive and normative. It then explains the broader significance of the belief‐credence connection and concludes with general lessons from the debate thus far. Video Abstract link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3eOSlPVYxI8&feature=youtu.be

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Belief is weak

Cited by 135 publications

References 22 publications

Requirements of intention in light of belief

Requirements of intention in light of belief

No Reasons to Believe the False

The relationship between belief and credence

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