Bernard Williams and the Basic Legitimation Demand: A Defence

Abstract

In this article I discuss Bernard Williams' realist conception of legitimacy. According to his critics Williams tacitly incorporates various moral claims, endorses a philosophically suspect 'consensus' view of politics, and employs an unrealistic and moralised conception of political rule. I argue that these criticisms mischaracterise the nature of the basic legitimation demand and the judgements about the acceptability of the state at its core and conclude that political theorists who object to the direction and style of much contemporary political theory should take seriously the possibility of developing an appropriately 'political' political theory on Williamsian lines.Keywords: Bernard Williams; basic legitimation demand; political realism; political moralism A number of thinkers concerned by the style of much contemporary political theory have recently attacked the suggestion that political theory is a branch of applied ethics and gestured towards the possibility of developing a more self-consciously realist approach. Chief among these is Bernard Williams, whose posthumous political essays have been influential in setting the agenda of the burgeoning realist movement in political theory. The basic legitimation demand (BLD) is central to Williams' realism because he claims it offers a distinctively political standard of evaluation that avoids the moralism of much contemporary political theory. However, commentators have recently disputed this claim by arguing that Williams tacitly incorporates moral claims, which precludes him from offering a realist alternative to political moralism, commits to a philosophically suspect consensus view of politics and endorses an unrealistic and moralised conception of politics itself. Hence, one critic concludes that Williams' realism 'shares significant features with liberal theory ... which means that it is vulnerable to the same critique that other realists have made of liberalism' (Sleat, 2010, p. 486) while another insists that it offers an 'unfeasible return to an ideal-type expectation' (Freeden, 2012, p. 6).In this article I focus on four influential criticisms because by engaging with Williams' critics we can better appreciate the attractions of thinking about politics in the terms he encourages. I argue that Williams' critics mischaracterise the nature of the BLD and the judgements about the acceptability of the state at its core, and conclude that political theorists who are uneasy with the moralism of much contemporary political theory should re-evaluate the attractions of thinking about politics in Williams' terms. The First Political QuestionWilliams claims that two forms of political moralism (PM) dominate political philosophy. Enactment models, like utilitarianism, formulate 'principles, concepts, ideals, and values' and seek to 'express these in political action', while structural models, like those of Rawls, spell bs_bs_banner

Realism in Normative Political Theory

“…Hence, and relating back to the previous theme of realism-as-ideological-critique, realism insists that political theorists recognise their own partisan and non-neutral status as interested agents in the real-world struggle for legitimation. (For further realist discussions of legitimacy see: Bavister-Gould 2013;Ermin and Möller 2013;Hall 2013a;Horton 2012;Larmore 2013;Mason 2010;Newey 2010;Rossi 2013;Rossi 2012;Sigwart 2013;Sleat 2011;Sleat 2010).…”

“…Others have argued that these political values can be explicated and operationalised without the need to make any appeal to moral values or principles (Jubb and Rossi forthcoming) (this claim can be made more radical by insisting that such values exhaust normativity in politics, hence leaving no space for the moral in politics). This latter position does not require us to appeal to meta-values to know when to deploy political as opposed to moral values: politically relevant predicaments can be individuated by considering the very concept of politics, which we can individuate by contrasting it to raw domination on the one hand, and personal interactions on the other hand (Hall 2013a, but also cf. Sleat 2010).…”

Political realism as ideology critique

“…Raw domination of the sort endured by the Helots in Sparta just isn't politics, and this is a conceptual rather than a moral claim. (Hall, 2015;Sagar, 2014;Williams, 2005, p. 5).…”

“…And the various exegetic extensions of it that have been recently put forward (e.g. Hall 2015, Sagar, 2014, Sleat, 2013a). 6.…”

Hobbes and political realism

“…6 There is much debate about whether Hobbes's moral theory is reducible to self-interest, but my argument does not take a stand on this. The most important reply to the Nagel-Rawls line of argument is Lloyd's (2009) Hall (2015). 9 Even if we grant that in times of war there is no politics taking place between the warring parties or states, politics still takes place within those parties or states.…”