Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Dilemmas of Middle Powers

Job, Brian L.

doi:10.1142/s1013251120400081

Cited by 6 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…These issue-areas do not permit neat compartmentalization into traditional security and economic spheres. As Brian Job and others have explained, the constraints on middle powers are tightening (Job, 2020). These countries are now ‘stuck’ between the two great superpowers, enjoying less ‘space’ to maneuver than before (Job, 2020: 1–4).…”

Section: Non-decision Decisions: Middle Powers Muddle Throughmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As Brian Job and others have explained, the constraints on middle powers are tightening (Job, 2020). These countries are now ‘stuck’ between the two great superpowers, enjoying less ‘space’ to maneuver than before (Job, 2020: 1–4). Under the Xi and Trump administrations, both the United States and the PRC have used ‘coercive economic tactics to threaten or punish middle powers and small states’ for transgressions (Job, 2020: 9).…”

Section: Non-decision Decisions: Middle Powers Muddle Throughmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These countries are now ‘stuck’ between the two great superpowers, enjoying less ‘space’ to maneuver than before (Job, 2020: 1–4). Under the Xi and Trump administrations, both the United States and the PRC have used ‘coercive economic tactics to threaten or punish middle powers and small states’ for transgressions (Job, 2020: 9). The growing rivalry, increasingly characterized by hawks on both sides ‘as a confrontation of ‘existential threats’’ – across a range of policy areas that straddle trade and security considerations – reduces the options available to middle powers and forces them into dilemmatic choices between sides (Job, 2020: 1).…”

Section: Non-decision Decisions: Middle Powers Muddle Throughmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Non-decision decisions in the Huawei 5G dilemma: Policy in Japan, the UK, and Germany

Krolikowski

Hall

2023

Japanese Journal of Political Science

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Huawei, the telecommunications company based in the People's Republic of China (PRC), has presented the governments of several middle powers with a policy dilemma. On the one hand, Huawei's affordable 5G network technology is attractive to telecommunications operators in these countries, which do not have domestic producers of this equipment. On the other hand, the U.S. government and intelligence agencies in other countries maintain that Huawei gear presents intolerable network security risks, a charge that the PRC government and Huawei forcefully reject as they insist Huawei merits access to foreign markets. Facing the question of whether and how to allow the installation of Huawei's 5G equipment in their domestic networks, the governments of Japan, the United Kingdom, and Germany have been caught between the competing demands of the two rivalrous superpowers and faced internal divisions among communities of government experts. At first glance, Japan, the UK, and Germany each appear to have responded to the Huawei dilemma in a different way. The Japanese government moved quickly and without formal announcement to exclude Huawei from its market, while publicly denying a ban. The UK government initially allowed Huawei to supply some of its national 5G infrastructure, but then reversed itself to ban the company's equipment outright after a U.S. regulatory change. The German government has yet to officially ban Huawei, but has taken successive steps to curtail the PRC company's continued involvement in its domestic networks. In spite of their apparent differences, the three national responses to the Huawei dilemma share a fundamental commonality: all amount to ‘non-decision decisions’ on the question of whether and how to allow Huawei to supply domestic 5G networks. In one way or another, each government avoided making policy decisions that were either explicit, definitive, or singular on the issue, but nonetheless reduced the likelihood of Huawei's participation in its domestic 5G infrastructure. After developing the concept of a ‘non-decision decision,’ we explain why these maneuvers are not isolated responses to a specific policy conundrum, but may presage a mode of middle power coping with competing demands from two increasingly rivalrous superpowers.

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Section: Non-decision Decisions: Middle Powers Muddle Throughmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Non-decision Decisions: Middle Powers Muddle Throughmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Non-decision Decisions: Middle Powers Muddle Throughmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Non-decision decisions in the Huawei 5G dilemma: Policy in Japan, the UK, and Germany

Krolikowski

Hall

2023

Japanese Journal of Political Science

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“…America's relative decline internationally and its approach to cooperation with allies carry significant implications for middle powers as they make up strategic policy decisions against the evolving balance of power. Obsessed over relative gains, Washington has characterized its confrontation with Beijing as one of existential threat and encompassing all aspects of its foreign policy (Job, 2020;Carment & Belo, 2020). Cooperation in an anarchic system is hindered by the value lesser states attribute to their independence from greater powers and by the zero-sum approach these same great powers apply in the face of competition (Grieco et al, 1993).…”

Section: The Cold War Analogy a Lazy Man's Metaphormentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The hardening multipolarity of the international system offers growing opportunities for other states to make gains across geopolitical axes, creating a malaise for today's great powers. Both the Americans and the Chinese seek to address this malaise by fundamentally revising the order of alliances, solidifying new norms of conducts, and selectively ignoring and/or eroding key aspects of the current order (Job, 2020;Carment & Belo, 2020). The two great powers pressure their allies via unilateral actions to encourage loyalty and punish defection in hopes to maximize their relative gains against their adversary (Carment & Belo, 2020).…”

Section: The Cold War Analogy a Lazy Man's Metaphormentioning

confidence: 99%

Canada-China Relations in the Age of Great Power Competition: An Assessment of Canadian Foreign Policy Decision Making and Strategic Outlook

Denis¹

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Canada has, so far, awkwardly navigated the current U.S.-China geopolitical competition undertaking an ambiguous position, often labeled as inaction in policy circles, that has rendered any foreign policy decisions difficult to assess from a strategic perspective. Despite bilateral frictions that saw Sino-Canadian relations brought to their lowest point since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1970, the Canadian government has yet to embark on a policy direction that would see it in strategic opposition to China regardless of the path its closest ally and current hegemon, the United States, has set for itself. The Canadian government has, in fact, adopted a hedging approach to the U.S.-China rivalry. Canadian foreign policy decision making, despite being in contradiction to traditional international theories that would see it balance with Washington, is consistent with Canada's policy of engagement towards China which emphasizes the need to work constructively with Beijing and the irrationality of containment for Canadian interests. Structural level theories, in treating middle powers like Canada as policytakers in the same manner as lesser powers, forgo their very role as supporters and builders of the Liberal International Order and, hence, their strategic commitment to enforcing its core tenets even in the absence of an American buttress. The current state of Canadian foreign policy exhibits an approach to great power competition anchored in the established order that recognizes the drawbacks of both balancing and bandwagoning in light of the framework Washington and Beijing have adopted to their rivalry.

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The structure of foreign policy attitudes among middle power publics: a transpacific replication

Gravelle¹,

Reifler

Scotto

2020

Australian Journal of International Affairs

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Empirical models illustrating how mass publics organise their views on foreign policy issues abound. Models that posit militant internationalism and cooperative internationalism as the two factors structuring mass foreign policy attitudes and that typically rely on American survey data have given way to models positing a larger number of underlying factors supported by cross-national survey data. Still, there are few studies assessing the cross-national validity of multi-factor models. Further, middle power states that must navigate between international leadership and followership remain understudied. This article draws on new survey data from Canada and Australia -two archetypal middle power states -to replicate a recent and influential model of foreign policy attitudes comprised of four factors: cooperative internationalism, militant internationalism, isolationism, and support for global justice. Using an exploratory structural equation modelling (ESEM) framework, it finds that the four-factor structure of foreign policy attitudes observed in the United States, United Kingdom, France and Germany obtains among the Canadian and Australian publics, yet there are country-specific nuances that suggest differences in the ways Canadians and Australians perceive foreign policy options.

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Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Dilemmas of Middle Powers

Cited by 6 publications

References 17 publications

Non-decision decisions in the Huawei 5G dilemma: Policy in Japan, the UK, and Germany

Non-decision decisions in the Huawei 5G dilemma: Policy in Japan, the UK, and Germany

Canada-China Relations in the Age of Great Power Competition: An Assessment of Canadian Foreign Policy Decision Making and Strategic Outlook

The structure of foreign policy attitudes among middle power publics: a transpacific replication

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