JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.T hroughout the post-World War II period the president has been called upon to make decisions concerning the use of force as a political instrument. The explanation that is offered is based upon a characterization of the president as a cybernetic human decision maker facing limitations. These limitations, in conjunction with the complexity of the environment, lead presidents to develop and use a relatively simple decision rule. The dependent variable, which is the probability of the use of force at any point in time, is explained in terms of enduring and essential concerns, which are operationalized as coming from the international, domestic, and personal environments.Data are taken from Blechman and Kaplan's Force Without War. On the basis of our estimation and evaluation, presidential decisions to use force are based on factors in all three arenas.

American foreign policy in Southeast Asia from 1975 to the present can be characterized as exhibiting varying degrees of benign neglect, with episodic attention to perceived security threats. Current policies are narrowly focused on anti-terrorism; their perceived anti-Muslim overtones, while engendering instrumental cooperation, have tended to alienate Southeast Asian publics. U.S. influence in Southeast Asia appears to be waning, with China capitalizing on opportunities to expand its influence.

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After a temporary downturn in many Asian states after the 1997 Economic Crisis defence expenditures are rising again. Although most states put internal and transborder security issues at the top of their list of potential threats, an examination of recent trends in regional defence expenditure trends and weapons acquisition patterns belies this. Resources are being directed predominately toward externally oriented weapons systems such as fighter aircraft, surface ships, submarines, and missiles of all types. The dramatic accumulation of such potentially destabilizing weapons systems, particularly in Asia's traditional flashpoints, risks fuelling competitive arms processes throughout the region.

“Middle powers,” variously defined, have served relevant and significant roles in the post-WWII regional and global orders, facilitated by structural conditions of “long peace” among great powers and proactive leadership by and among creative middle powers. Within the complex Asia-Pacific security order, “middle powers” such as Australia, Canada, and South Korea have had the “space” to engage the non-like minded and advance multilateralism with security guarantees from the US. However, Beijing and Washington today are eliminating this space and its associated choices for middle-power diplomacy by increasingly characterizing their rivalry as a confrontation of “existential threats” between incompatible “civilizations” and securitizing trade and technology. China and the US are each selectively ignoring or purposely eroding key aspects of a rules-based international order. This paper highlights the dilemmas of South Korea, Australia, and Canada, middle powers who have found themselves individually and collectively “stuck” facing contradictory global and regional policy choices.