2017
DOI: 10.1080/14702436.2017.1350107
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Between defence autarky and dependency: the dynamics of Turkish defence industrialization

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Cited by 17 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…In Chile, by contrast, reform failure, in postponing key decisions about the composition of defense industrial governance structures, must have also delayed choices about creating new institutions to advance the sector. As in Turkey, where, as Kurç (2017) shows, civil−military rivalry prevented the country from reaching its desired goal of defense autarky, the result of these institutional deficiencies was a less dynamic defense industry.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In Chile, by contrast, reform failure, in postponing key decisions about the composition of defense industrial governance structures, must have also delayed choices about creating new institutions to advance the sector. As in Turkey, where, as Kurç (2017) shows, civil−military rivalry prevented the country from reaching its desired goal of defense autarky, the result of these institutional deficiencies was a less dynamic defense industry.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A different scenario is that of the Turkish defense industries, which have significantly improved their production capacity since 1980, reaching a production level of 54% in 2011 and expecting to reach the defense industrial autarky in 2023 (Kurç 2017). However, Kurç (2017) also states that the Turkish defense industry remains inefficient due to weak institutions and civil-military rivalry. Although foreign partnerships have accelerated the development of defense companies, they continue to suffer from weak investments in research and development.…”
Section: Qualitative Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This lack of change within the General Staff caused resentment among junior officers whose upward mobility was restricted. After Çakmak’s forced retirement in 1944, civilian control over the armed forces increased further, thanks to an organizational restructuring (Kurç, 2017, p. 262). In a symbolic move, the Chief of the General Staff became responsible to the Prime Ministry and 5 years later to the Defense Ministry (Harris, 1965, p. 63).…”
Section: Historical Backgroundmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In order to terminate the organic ties between the political and military leadership, the DP government retired 16 generals and 150 colonels following rumors that senior commanders pledged their allegiance to İnönü on election night (Hale, 2011, p. 199). These changes came against the backdrop of Turkey’s entry into North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which made the military’s structural problems—such as outdated equipment, inadequate resources, and conservative leadership—more apparent (Kurç, 2017). NATO membership created new career opportunities for junior and field officers who spoke English and were trained in modern warfare.…”
Section: Historical Backgroundmentioning
confidence: 99%