With almost $1 billion in funding, Better Place was poised to become one of the most 10 innovative companies in the electric mobility market. The system Better Place proposed had two novel 11 prongs; first, to reduce the cost of batteries, and second, to reduce range anxiety, public infrastructure 12 concerns, and long charging times. Yet, despite this seemingly strong combination, Better Place failed to 13 make any progress in Denmark and Israel, the first two markets it operated in, and subsequently 14 declared bankruptcy, selling off its collective assets for less than $500,000. Drawing from science and 15 technology studies and the notion of "interpretive flexibility," this paper posits several reasons to 16 explain the failure of Better Place, including that Denmark is not as "green" as it seems nor is the Israeli 17 market as attractive as believed, and that Better Place's solution to charging time and range anxiety 18 resolved a psychological, not a functional, barrier of the general public to adopt electric vehicles. Before 19 investigating these two reasons, the paper presents a short history of Better Place and explores the 20 contours of its operations in Denmark and Israel. It then discusses why Better Place "failed" across both 21 countries before concluding with implications for energy planning, policy, and analysis. 22 2