Beyond the Nation‐State: Privatization of Economic Sanctions

Hufbauer, Gary Clyde; Oegg, Barbara

doi:10.1111/1475-4967.00111

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…While the Congress can override the veto with a two-thirds vote in both houses, it has only overridden vetoed sanctions legislation once in the time period that this paper examines, when it imposed sanctions on South Africa (Stewart and Harness 1992; Thomson and Davis 2001). Even then, most sanctions legislation allows the president to waive enforcement if he or she thinks that doing so is in the national interest (Hufbauer and Oegg 2003). Therefore, for a diaspora to influence sanctions policy, it will have to influence the president.…”

Section: Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Sanctioning the Homeland: Diasporas’ Influence on American Economic Sanctions Policy

Kustra

2021

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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Why do some immigrant groups succeed in influencing the U.S. government to impose economic sanctions on their former dictators, while others do not? This paper begins by noting that the president is the pivotal player in sanctions policy and that presidents cater to voters in swing states. Therefore, a diaspora’s proportion of the swing-state electorate should determine whether the American government imposes sanctions on their former homeland. Considering dictatorships from 1946 to 2005, this paper finds that a one-percentage-point increase in the diaspora’s proportion of the swing-state electorate increases the probability of regime-change sanctions by 11 percentage points. It then calculates causal estimates of the effectiveness of these sanctions on regime change. Using the diaspora’s proportion of the swing-state electorate as an instrumental variable for the presence of economic sanctions, it finds that sanctions do not have a positive, statistically-significant impact on regime change while a negative impact is plausible.

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Section: Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Sanctioning the Homeland: Diasporas’ Influence on American Economic Sanctions Policy

Kustra

2021

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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“…Several studies conclude that only harsh measures can convince the target to make a significant change in its plans. Examples include Lam (1990), Hufbauer and Oegg (2003), Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, and Oegg (2009), and Whang (2010). In a theoretical study, Beladi and Oladi (2009) argue that from the target country point of view, partial compliance plus mild sanctions is an equilibrium outcome and Pareto superior to non-compliance and harsh economic sanctions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The impact of financial sanctions: The case of Iran

Ghasseminejad¹

2021

Journal of Policy Modeling

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This study provides a detailed analysis of the impact of financial sanctions on publicly traded companies. We consider the effect of imposing and lifting sanctions on the target country's traded equities and examine the differences in the reaction of politically connected firms and those without such connections. The paper focuses on Iran due to (1) its sizable financial markets, (2) imposition of sanctions of varying severity and duration on private and state-owned companies, (3) the significant presence of politically connected firms in the stock market, and (4) the unique event of the 2015 nuclear deal, resulting in fairly rapid lifting of a sizable portion of imposed sanctions. We find that sanctions affect politically connected firms more than ordinary firms, have lasting negative effects on profitability ratios, and that politically connected firms stock prices bounce back more slowly after removal of sanctions. Firms targeted by financial sanctions decrease their leverage and increase their cash holding to manage their perceived increase in risk profile.

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Bipartisanship in a Polarized Age: The U.S. Congress and Foreign Policy Sanctions

Tama

2015

SSRN Journal

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Beyond the Nation‐State: Privatization of Economic Sanctions

Cited by 4 publications

References 2 publications

Sanctioning the Homeland: Diasporas’ Influence on American Economic Sanctions Policy

Sanctioning the Homeland: Diasporas’ Influence on American Economic Sanctions Policy

The impact of financial sanctions: The case of Iran

Bipartisanship in a Polarized Age: The U.S. Congress and Foreign Policy Sanctions

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