Beyond the skin bag: on the moral responsibility of extended agencies

Hanson, F. Allan

doi:10.1007/s10676-009-9184-z

Cited by 57 publications

(32 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…The step from a critical-posthumanist approach, such as Donna Haraway's, with responsibility as a relational concept in the narrow sense towards a techno-and robot-ethical theory can be taken with the text "Beyond the skin bag: on the moral responsibility of extended agencies" (2009) by F. Allan Hanson, which will be presented exemplarily in the following. Here, he contrasts the traditional position of a methodological and ethical individualism with the theory of an "extended agency" [105] (p. 91). For several centuries we have been accustomed, according to Hanson, to understanding a subject of action as an autonomous, monadic entity, even if this notion is neither historically uniform nor particularly old.…”

Section: Inclusive Approaches In Robot Ethics: Ascribing Responsibilimentioning

confidence: 98%

“…With regard to the ascription of moral agency, however, the traditional understanding of the moral agent is questioned in order to extend it to nonhuman beings. On the other hand, competences that have been ascribed essentialistically to individual subjects of actions within the framework of the usual approaches should now be understood relationally and processually as realizing themselves in the interaction of different agents and non-agents [69,[105][106][107][108][109]. With a view to robots as objects of moral actions, the debate in this third area of robot ethics also revolves around, for instance, the anthropomorphization of nonhuman beings and the possibility of entering into relationships with them.…”

Section: The Three Fields Of Robot Ethicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Responsibility and Robot Ethics: A Critical Overview

Loh

2019

Philosophies

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This paper has three concerns: first, it represents an etymological and genealogical study of the phenomenon of responsibility. Secondly, it gives an overview of the three fields of robot ethics as a philosophical discipline and discusses the fundamental questions that arise within these three fields. Thirdly, it will be explained how in these three fields of robot ethics is spoken about responsibility and how responsibility is attributed in general. As a philosophical paper, it presents a theoretical approach and no practical suggestions are made as to which robots should bear responsibility under which circumstances or how guidelines should be formulated in which a responsible use of robots is outlined.

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Section: Inclusive Approaches In Robot Ethics: Ascribing Responsibilimentioning

confidence: 98%

Section: The Three Fields Of Robot Ethicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Responsibility and Robot Ethics: A Critical Overview

Loh

2019

Philosophies

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“…That considered, our definition purposefully avoids this philosophical distinction. Instead, the central concept of our two definitions is a matter of responsibility, specifically, whether a machine can ever be considered accountable for its actions (Stahl, 2006), and whether moral responsibility can ever be transferred from a human (the designer or operator) to the machine (Hanson, 2009)? If yes, then the machine is an AMA; if not, it is defined as an AEA if it still operates within ethical considerations.…”

Section: Defining Artificial Ethicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Another example is euro-transplant, a software tool which generates priority lists of organ recipients based on various factors (age, waiting time, distance between donor and recipient) and must follow the medical ethical criteria (Hanson, 2009). What makes this example particularly interesting is that it is generally believed that the software is capable of making these judgements better than previous (human controlled) systems (de Waal, 2007).…”

Section: Artificial Ethical Agentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sexbots: a case for artificial ethical agents

2019

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Recent years have seen significant developments in Artificial Intelligence and we are now beginning to see some applications applied to sexual technologies. This has led to certain individuals and groups calling for a ban on the development of artificial sexual companions or "sexbots". This is largely due to fears that commercialising sex in this way could could re-enforce existing gender inequalities, and sexual objectification. We argue that one possible risk mitigation strategy could be to develop ethical safeguards into sexual robots. In this paper we explore the problem of implementing artificial ethical agents through a review of the relevant literature. We begin by exploring the motivation to the problem, and the science fiction that has inspired it. Following this, the practical, and philosophical implementation challenges are discussed before providing an overview of the current state of the art. The paper concludes by introducing the grand challenges of the field. ARTICLE HISTORY

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“…Anthropologist F. Allan Hanson (2009) argues that what he calls ''extended agencies'' can be held responsible for their actions. Hanson's notion of extended agencies includes distributed cognitive systems and actor networks, but also individuals interacting with a single artifact.…”

Section: Distributed Responsibilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Distributed Cognition and Distributed Morality: Agency, Artifacts and Systems

Heersmink

2016

Sci Eng Ethics

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There are various philosophical approaches and theories describing the intimate relation people have to artifacts. In this paper, I explore the relation between two such theories, namely distributed cognition and distributed morality theory. I point out a number of similarities and differences in these views regarding the ontological status they attribute to artifacts and the larger systems they are part of. Having evaluated and compared these views, I continue by focussing on the way cognitive artifacts are used in moral practice. I specifically conceptualise how such artifacts (a) scaffold and extend moral reasoning and decision-making processes, (b) have a certain moral status which is contingent on their cognitive status, and (c) whether responsibility can be attributed to distributed systems. This paper is primarily written for those interested in the intersection of cognitive and moral theory as it relates to artifacts, but also for those independently interested in philosophical debates in extended and distributed cognition and ethics of (cognitive) technology.

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Beyond the skin bag: on the moral responsibility of extended agencies

Abstract: for stimulating criticisms and suggestions as I prepared this essay.

Cited by 57 publications

References 15 publications

Responsibility and Robot Ethics: A Critical Overview

Responsibility and Robot Ethics: A Critical Overview

Sexbots: a case for artificial ethical agents

Distributed Cognition and Distributed Morality: Agency, Artifacts and Systems

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