“Traditional culture” is increasingly recognized to be more an invention constructed for contemporary purposes than a stable heritage handed on from the past. Anthropologists often participate in the creative process. Two distinct inventions of New Zealand Maori culture are analyzed, together with the role of anthropologists in each of them. The conclusion explores the logic of culture invention and some of its implications for the practice of anthropology.

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for stimulating criticisms and suggestions as I prepared this essay.

One concern regarding developments in genetics is that, when techniques such as genetic engineering become safe and affordable, people will use them for positive eugenics: to "improve" their offspring by enpowering them with exceptional qualities. Another is whether new reproductive technologies are being used to improve the condition of women or as the tools of a patriarchal system that appropriates female functions to itself and exploits women to further its own ends. Donor insemination is relevant to both of these issues. The degree to which people have used donor insemination in the past for positive eugenic purposes may give some insight into the likelihood of developing technologies being so used in the future. Donor insemination provides women with the opportunity to reproduce with only the most remote involvement of a man. To what degree do women take advantage of this to liberate themselves from male dominance? Through questionnaires and interviews, women who have used donor insemination disclosed their criteria for selecting sperm donors. The results are analyzed for the prevalence of positive eugenic criteria in the selection process and women's attitudes toward minimizing the male role in reproduction.

Despite proposals by Kroeber and others that society and culture represent a distinct level of reality, the prevailing opinion has been that they are abstractions from the behavior of individuals. Recently that position, methodological individualism, has been challenged on several fronts. Especially with the incorporation of artificial intelligence into many aspects of social life, it is no longer feasible to consider the ultimate unit of social action to be the human individual. Bolstered with a case study of the consequences of automation for the legal profession, the argument here is that agency should be redefined in a more expansive and dynamic manner that includes but is not limited to the individual.