Bicameralism in Belgium: the dismantlement of the Senate for the sake of multinational confederalism

Abstract

Belgium was established in 1830 as a unitary state with a bicameral parliament, with symmetrical powers for the upper and the lower house. While federalism and bicameralism are often considered a pair, the Belgian system shows an inverse relationship. The Senate gradually turned into a house representative of the sub-states, but its powers declined inversely proportional to the level of decentralisation of the Belgian state. This paper inquires how the dismantling of the Belgian Senate fits in the increasingly devolutionary nature of the Belgian state structure. First, it nuances the link between bicameralism and federalism: bicameralism is an institutional device for federalism, but not by necessity, and only under specific conditions. The official narrative is that the Belgian Senate was reformed to turn it into a house of the sub-states in line as a federal principle, but in reality the conditions to fulfil this task are not fulfilled. Instead, the paper holds that bicameralism in Belgium is subordinate to the needs of multinational conflict management, and that complying with the federative ideal of an upper house giving voice to the collective needs of the sub-states would stand in the way of the evolution of the Belgian system towards confederalism based on two major linguistic groups.

Bicameralidad o Unicameralidad: El dilema del Parlamento Peruano

“…Esta visión puede esclarecer la complejidad de la asignación de poderes y quehaceres (Belser, 2018). Por ejemplo, podemos señalar el caso de Bélgica, su parlamento bicameral sucumbe a las necesidades de una gestión de conflictos multinacionales, y de cumplir con la meta asociativa de una cámara alta repercutiendo el llamado de las carencias sociales se estaría mostrando la efectividad de esta forma parlamentaria (Popelier, 2018) | doi.org/10.33386/593dp.2021.2-2.567 Ponce (2015) señala que dos Cámaras constituyen un aval del trabajo parlamentario, el cual se debe desarrollar con meticulosidad y reflexión, eludir una toma de decisiones espontáneas o instintivas, por otro lado, la existencia de una cámara facilita a los ciudadanos mayor información sobre los procesos legislativos en debate. Asimismo, Passaglia (2018) nos señala que el bicameralismo se define a partir de la relación entre las dos cámaras y las acciones desplegadas por la segunda.…”

Fiscal Consolidation in Federal Belgium

“…Even though territorial representation in the Belgian Senate was strengthened in 1993 and 2011, both reforms have significantly reduced the powers of the second chamber, and the Senate cannot veto federal decision-making (Dandoy, Dodeigne, Reuchamps & Vandeleene, 2015;Deschouwer, 2012, pp. 182-184;Popelier, 2018;Sägesser & Istasse, 2014). Other mechanisms that give the constituent units a voice in federal decision-making are also non-existent, such as consultation procedures, through which the Swiss cantons can influence federal bills (Vatter, 2016), or an integrated and decentralized party system in which the regional branches are sufficiently influential to be able to leverage the national branches (Bednar, 2009, pp.…”