Bicameralism, nationality and party cohesion in the European Parliament

Abstract

Party cohesion in legislatures is a topic of longstanding concern to political scientists because cohesion facilitates democratic representation. We examine the cohesion of transnational party groups in the European Parliament, which is part of the EU's bicameral system, and study the oftentimes competing pressures to which MEPs are subject from their EP party groups and national governments. Our explanation focuses on the conditions under which MEPs take policy positions that differ from those of their party groups. We propose that national governments lobby their national MEPs more intensely on issues of high national salience and on which they are in a weak bargaining position in the Council. The analyses offer a unique approach to the study of party cohesion that is based on the policy positions taken by each national delegation of MEPs in each of the three main party groups and national governments on specific controversial issues.

When politics prevails: Parties, elections and loyalty in the European Parliament

“…EU laws are adopted in a bicameral system, and while European elections determine the EP's composition, national elections influence the composition of the EP's co‐legislator: the intergovernmental Council of the European Union. Co‐deciding legislation is easier the more politically aligned the EP and Council (Costello & Thomson ), and transnational groups can expect positive spillovers into the next European election from their constituent parties’ national electoral success.…”

“…). Recent studies also demonstrate that national parties’ issue salience impacts on MEPs’ voting behaviour (Klüver & Spoon ; Costello & Thomson ). However, the impact of national elections on the EU's actors, negotiations and decision making has been surprisingly under‐explored (but see Schneider () and Kleine & Minaudier () on intergovernmental negotiations).…”

It is all about value: How domestic party brands influence voting patterns in the European Parliament

“…More specifically, MEPs from institutionalized systems view their national party brand as more valuable than that of their European party, whereas MEPs from less institutionalized systems, where party brands are less valuable, favor their European party brand and are more likely to vote along European party lines. This theory contributes to a recent debate on the links between domestic and supranational institutions in the EU context (Costello & Thomson, 2016;Daniel, 2015;Schmitt & Thomassen, 2009;Winzen, Roederer-Rynning, & Schimmelfennig, 2015), and adds to studies that move beyond the simple old-new member state distinction to consider more theoretical differences between political parties across Europe (Rohrschneider & Whitefield, 2012). I identify two mechanisms underlying MEP voting behavior: career advancement and informational constraints.…”

The responsiveness of legislative actors to stakeholders’ demands in the European Union

“…These policy positions are aggregations of distinct positions taken within the EP, by the EP party groupings and sometimes also by groups of national MEPs (Hix, Noury and Roland 2007;McElroy and Benoit 2012). A recent study examined the policy positions of party groups and national factions in the EP on the same specific issues that were debated by the member states in the Council (Costello and Thomson 2014). This could be extended to examine the conditions under which groups within the EP agree with stakeholders' demands.…”

“…As with the previous hypothesis on the Commission, evidence for this proposition is far from a foregone conclusion. Nationality plays an important role in structuring the careers and therefore behaviour of MEPs, as well as the management of EP business, and national governments and domestic interest groups still attempt to influence 'their' MEPs (Raunio 2000;Kreppel 2002: 202-5;Mamadouh and Raunio 2003;Whitaker 2005;Costello and Thomson 2014).…”