No abstract

We present a new dataset on decision-making in the European Union (DEUII) that revises and expands a previous dataset. Researchers are using this new dataset to address a range of research questions regarding the inputs, processes and outputs of the EU's legislative system. The dataset contains information on 331 controversial issues raised by 125 legislative proposals that were introduced between 1996 and 2008. For each of these controversial issues, the dataset identifies the policy alternative favoured most by each of the main political actors: the European Commission; the European Parliament; and each of the member states' representatives in the Council of Ministers. This information was assembled during 349 semi-structured interviews with key informants. This article describes the dataset and identifies its relevance to several research agendas in EU studies

It is often said that European Parliament elections fail as an instrument to express the will of the European people. However, while the elections are not contested at the European level and are often dominated by national issues, this does not necessarily imply that they fail to connect policy views of voters and representatives. We examine policy congruence between voters and candidates, utilizing the candidate and voter surveys of the European Election Study 2009. First, we demonstrate that policy preferences of candidates and voters are constrained by three separate policy dimensions. Second, we show that the quality of representation is high in terms of left/right, the main dimension of conflict in European politics, but lower on the cultural and European integration dimensions.Finally, we demonstrate that in some cases the aggregation of national parties in political groups in the European Parliament poses problems for effective political representation.

No abstract

The codecision procedure was designed to change the distribution of power among the EU institutions. In theory, the codecision procedure, at least the amended version introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty that came into effect in 1999, weakened the Commission and placed the Parliament on an equal footing with the Council. We assess how the codecision procedure works in practice using data on the preferences of legislative actors on a large number of proposals negotiated between 1999 and 2009. We also test theoretical propositions derived from Schelling regarding the effects of policy agreement within each chamber on the relative bargaining success of the Council and EP. Our findings suggest that, in comparison to the consultation procedure, codecision has strengthened the EP and weakened the Commission.However, the Council holds certain bargaining advantages over the EP, and as a result the EP has not achieved parity with the Council under codecision.