Election Pledges and their Enactment in Coalition Governments: A Comparative Analysis of Ireland

Costello, Rory; Thomson, Robert

doi:10.1080/17457280802227652

Cited by 81 publications

(95 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…Each of the 3,681 pledges made by the main parties in the elections during this period were examined qualitatively to assess fulfilment. The existing studies that examined subsets of the data we examine were limited to aggregate-level summaries of overall rates of pledge fulfilment and bivariate statistics, and did not examine the impact of economic conditions on pledge fulfilment (Mansergh, 2004;Mansergh & Thomson, 2007;Costello & Thomson, 2008).…”

Section: This Is the Author Version Of An Article Published In Irish mentioning

confidence: 99%

Governing together in good and bad economic times: the fulfilment of election pledges in Ireland

Thomson

Costello

2016

Irish Political Studies

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The idea that parties make promises to voters during election campaigns and then attempt to fulfil those promises if elected to government is central to the theory and practice of democracy. This study examines how economic conditions affect the fulfilment of parties' election pledges in Ireland. We formulate and test propositions relating to two mechanisms relating to economic conditions that negatively affect the likelihood of pledge fulfilment. The first is that parties do not adjust pledges to prevailing economic conditions, and the second is that they do not accurately anticipate future economic conditions. We test these expectations with evidence on the fulfilment of 3,681 pledges made by Irish parties in the period 1977 and 2011, which is one of the largest country-specific datasets on pledge fulfilment currently available. Given the considerable variation in economic conditions faced by Irish governments in this time period, these cases offer a particularly powerful test of the impact of economic conditions on pledge fulfilment. Studies, 31:2 (2016), pp. 182-203 2 According mandate theory and the responsible party model, the fulfilment of election pledges by governing parties is central to democratic representation, providing a mechanism through which citizens exercise control over public policy (Downs, 1957;Klingemann et al., 1994). Parties offer competing policy platforms to voters and 'the party which attracts the most votes on this basis then forms the next government, but it is bound (both morally and by fears of retribution at the next election) to carry through the program on which on which it has been elected' (Budge & Hofferbert, 1990: 111). This is the author version of an article published in Irish PoliticalExisting research on pledge fulfilment has found considerable variation in the extent to which governing parties fulfil their election pledges and has identified a number of factors that help to explain this, such as the role of the party in government, the institutional division of power, and the nature of the pledges made (e.g. Pomper & Lederman, 1980;Rallings, 1987;Royed, 1996;Thomson, 2001;Artés & Bustos, 2008;Naurin, 2011;2014;Kostadinova, 2013). We contribute to this growing body of comparative research by examining how economic conditions influence pledge fulfilment.Our empirical analysis focuses on pledge fulfilment in Ireland over a 34-year period, 1977-2011. The eleven Irish governments that held office between 1977 and 2011 varied considerably from each other with respect to the economic conditions they faced, including the boom years of the Celtic tiger as well as the bust following the 2008 financial crisis. This means that our cases offer considerable variation in our key explanatory variables concerning economic conditions. Moreover, by examining variation in pledge fulfilment across these eleven governments, we hold constant important features of the political culture, party system and electoral system that may account for some of the variation in pledge fulfi...

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Section: This Is the Author Version Of An Article Published In Irish mentioning

confidence: 99%

Governing together in good and bad economic times: the fulfilment of election pledges in Ireland

Thomson

Costello

2016

Irish Political Studies

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“…This strategy, which acknowledged the importance of an adequate income for all, was launched in 14 1997 by a centre-left coalition formed by Fine Gael and the Labour party. A few months after, this coalition was defeated by a Finna Fail/ Progressive Democrats centre-right coalition (Costello and Thomson, 2008). Yet, "following a slow start" and with some modifications, the new approach "was adopted by the new government who took ownership of the strategy and has since developed it substantially" (Johnston, 2007;Adshead, 2010).…”

Section: Labour Market Policiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The politics of poverty in the European Union: how states respond to the open method of coordination on social inclusion

Noël

Larocque

2014

Policy &Amp; Politics

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This article assesses the responses of EU–15 member states to the poverty reduction objectives of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) on social inclusion between 2001 and 2006. As a flexible mechanism of information sharing between governments, the OMC could not produce strong convergence. A thorough analysis of the OMC documents indeed points to the enduring power of national institutions and partisan politics, for the three dimensions of social inclusion identified by the EU (rights, labour market policies, and participation). There was however some learning and adaptation around emerging policy ideas like activation and the participation of people experiencing poverty.

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“…Studium naplňování slibů u jednobarevných vlád, probíhající od šedesá-tých let 20. století (USA - Pomper [1968], Pomper, Lederman [1980]; Velká Británie - Royed [1996], Bara [2005]; Řecko - Kalogeropoulou [1989]), bylo na pře-lomu tisíciletí doplněno zaměřením na sliby stran koaličních vlád (Nizozemsko, Irsko, Nový Zéland či Rakousko - Thomson [2001], Mansergh [2004], Mansergh, Thomson [2007], Costello, Thomson [2008] Thomson et al [2012]). Výzkum se však rozšiřuje i areálově, studie dnes pokrývají země postkomunistické Evropy (Čes-ká republika -Roberts [nedatováno], Škvrňák [2015]; Bulharsko -Kostadinova [2013]; Polsko -Zubek, Klüver [2013]; Maďarsko -Dobos, Guylai [2015], Szűcz, Pál [2012]) a Turecko [Toros 2015].…”

Section: Model Stranického Mandátuunclassified

“…Vyšší pravděpodobnost naplnění byla zjištěna u slibů premiérské strany, při zanesení slibu do koaliční smlouvy nebo pokud slib spadal do kompetence ministerstva, které bylo slibující straně při-děleno [Thomson 2001;Schermann, Ennser-Jedenastik 2012]. Pravděpodobnost prosazení dále zvyšuje důležitost slibu pro stranu, konsensuální charakter slibu pro koaliční partnery, obsah odkazující k udržení statusu quo [Thomson 2001;Costello, Thomson 2008;Mansergh, Thomson 2007;Royed 1996;Thomson et al 2012], malá vzdálenost stran v konkrétní obsahové dimenzi či většinová podpora slibu v parlamentu [Schermann, Ennser-Jedenastik 2012: 6]. Zkoumán bývá i vliv vnějších podmínek, který ukázal, že ekonomická prosperita země zvyšuje šanci na naplnění slibu.…”

Section: Model Stranického Mandátuunclassified

Empty Promises? Election Promise Fulfilment among Coalition Parties in the Czech Republic between 2006 and 2015

Svačinová¹

2016

Czech Sociological Review

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Party mandate theory claims that parties form government coalitions so that they can fulfi l their election promises. This article looks at the party mandate model as applied to the arena of post-communist Europe and at the obstacles that can prevent a party from fulfi lling its mandate (the presence of a new type of party, hyperaccountability, short-lived governments). The article describes the fi ndings from a study examining the degree to which socio-economic legislative promises were fulfi lled by the second government of Mirek Topolánek, the fi rst government of Petr Nečas, and the (recent) government of Bohuslav Sobotka after a year and a half for all governments, and in the end of the term for Topolánek's and Nečas' governments. Coalition parties were found to have fulfi lled 19-40% of their election promises after a year and a half in offi ce, and this percentage had only increased slightly by the time the two governments that were studied for the full duration of their time in offi ce had reached the end of their term. Binary logistic regression models revealed that the odds of election promises being fulfi lled are greater if a promise is formulated as a commitment to maintain the status quo and if a promise is consensual and included in a coalition agreement. By contrast, there was no effect observed to result from party control of government ministries or from the advantage of being the prime ministerial party.

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Election Pledges and their Enactment in Coalition Governments: A Comparative Analysis of Ireland

Cited by 81 publications

References 5 publications

Governing together in good and bad economic times: the fulfilment of election pledges in Ireland

Governing together in good and bad economic times: the fulfilment of election pledges in Ireland

The politics of poverty in the European Union: how states respond to the open method of coordination on social inclusion

Empty Promises? Election Promise Fulfilment among Coalition Parties in the Czech Republic between 2006 and 2015

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