Governing together in good and bad economic times: the fulfilment of election pledges in Ireland

Abstract

The idea that parties make promises to voters during election campaigns and then attempt to fulfil those promises if elected to government is central to the theory and practice of democracy. This study examines how economic conditions affect the fulfilment of parties' election pledges in Ireland. We formulate and test propositions relating to two mechanisms relating to economic conditions that negatively affect the likelihood of pledge fulfilment. The first is that parties do not adjust pledges to prevailing economic conditions, and the second is that they do not accurately anticipate future economic conditions. We test these expectations with evidence on the fulfilment of 3,681 pledges made by Irish parties in the period 1977 and 2011, which is one of the largest country-specific datasets on pledge fulfilment currently available. Given the considerable variation in economic conditions faced by Irish governments in this time period, these cases offer a particularly powerful test of the impact of economic conditions on pledge fulfilment. Studies, 31:2 (2016), pp. 182-203 2 According mandate theory and the responsible party model, the fulfilment of election pledges by governing parties is central to democratic representation, providing a mechanism through which citizens exercise control over public policy (Downs, 1957;Klingemann et al., 1994). Parties offer competing policy platforms to voters and 'the party which attracts the most votes on this basis then forms the next government, but it is bound (both morally and by fears of retribution at the next election) to carry through the program on which on which it has been elected' (Budge & Hofferbert, 1990: 111). This is the author version of an article published in Irish PoliticalExisting research on pledge fulfilment has found considerable variation in the extent to which governing parties fulfil their election pledges and has identified a number of factors that help to explain this, such as the role of the party in government, the institutional division of power, and the nature of the pledges made (e.g. Pomper & Lederman, 1980;Rallings, 1987;Royed, 1996;Thomson, 2001;Artés & Bustos, 2008;Naurin, 2011;2014;Kostadinova, 2013). We contribute to this growing body of comparative research by examining how economic conditions influence pledge fulfilment.Our empirical analysis focuses on pledge fulfilment in Ireland over a 34-year period, 1977-2011. The eleven Irish governments that held office between 1977 and 2011 varied considerably from each other with respect to the economic conditions they faced, including the boom years of the Celtic tiger as well as the bust following the 2008 financial crisis. This means that our cases offer considerable variation in our key explanatory variables concerning economic conditions. Moreover, by examining variation in pledge fulfilment across these eleven governments, we hold constant important features of the political culture, party system and electoral system that may account for some of the variation in pledge fulfi...

Do parties still shape policies in times of crisis? The impact of financial constraints on partisan policymaking in Italy (1996–2018)

“…At first glance, it is perfectly plausible to expect that an economic crisis generates major financial and political limitations to the realization of parties' electoral manifestos, as previous studies outlined (Pétry and Duval, 2018;Thomson and Costello, 2016). Needless to say, during a recession period, when public budgets are curtailed and sovereign debt increases, parties have to deal with strained resources to finance their policy measures (Morlino and Quaranta, 2016).…”

“…While the aforementioned works include economic growth in their statistical models mainly as a control factor, two single-country studies investigate more thoroughly how economic situations affect government performance since institutional factors are held constant. Thomson and Costello (2016) do precisely that by focusing on the influence of economic conditions on pledge fulfilment in Ireland. According to their findings, the realization of election promises is less likely when economic conditions deteriorate.…”

Pitivätkö Sipilän hallituksen puolueet vaalilupauksensa?

“…Myös maan taloudellisen tilanteen on havaittu vaikuttavan siihen, missä määrin hallituspuolueet pystyvät täyttämään vaalilupauksiaan: kun talouskasvu ja julkinen talous ovat vahvoja, lupaukset on helpompi pitää kuin hitaan talouskasvun ja heikon julkisen talouden aikana (Pétry ja Duval 2018;Praprotnik 2017;Thomson ja Costello 2016). Monipuoluepolitiikassa puolueiden yksi-tai erimielisyys voi ratkaista poliittisen hankkeen kohtalon.…”

How governments strategically time welfare state reform legislation: empirical evidence from five European countries

“…Moreover, and thirdly, we know from the welfare state literature and studies on electoral pledges, that most governments tend to promise expansionary politics. Thomson and Costello (2016) show, based on a handcoded material from Ireland, that expansionary pledges are most common. Similarly, the pledge data collected by Thomson et al (2017a) in 12 countries also supports this result: The authors coded 3,373 pledges to increase spending or policy programs and a bare 364 instances where a pledge referred to a cut in spending or programs.…”

“…On the first point, the finding that governments use the first months in office to curb the welfare state runs against the literature on electoral pledges which have found 1) that pledges are mostly fulfilled (Thomson et al 2017b), 2) that pledge fulfillment is most probable in the first months in office (Duval and Pétry 2019), and 3) that pledges are mostly expansionary in natureat least in the realm of the welfare state (Horn and Jensen 2017; Thomson and Costello 2016). These findings are also in line with mandate theory according to which parties to a large extent do fulfill what they have promised in the election campaign (although to varying degrees) (Budge et al 2001;Klingemann et al 2006;Klingemann et al 1994).…”