2012
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-34961-4_33
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Bicliques for Permutations: Collision and Preimage Attacks in Stronger Settings

Abstract: Abstract. We extend and improve biclique attacks, which were recently introduced for the cryptanalysis of block ciphers and hash functions. While previous attacks required a primitive to have a key or a message schedule, we show how to mount attacks on the primitives with these parameters fixed, i.e. on permutations. We introduce the concept of sliced bicliques, which is a translation of regular bicliques to the framework with permutations. The new framework allows to convert preimage attacks into collision at… Show more

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Cited by 8 publications
(5 citation statements)
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“…[18] as a translation of a regular biclique to permutations. It helps to carry out regular preimage and collision attacks on MMObased and MP-based primitives.…”
Section: Sliced-biclique Techniquementioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…[18] as a translation of a regular biclique to permutations. It helps to carry out regular preimage and collision attacks on MMObased and MP-based primitives.…”
Section: Sliced-biclique Techniquementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Instead of the rebound attack, the meet-in-the-middle (MITM) attack is used to show preimage and collision attacks on hash function. The specific technique is sliced-biclique technique [18] and it utilizes a generic method to convert MITM preimage attacks into collision attacks in the narrow-pipe hash functions proposed at FSE 2012 [19]. At Inscrypt 2014, Megha Agrawal et al [20] have used this technique to show a collision attack on 4-branch, Type-2 GFN-based hash function.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…The computational cost effort, for our IDN scheme, to find a collision is approximately 2 n/2 , n = 256 (k-bit), for birthday attacks. Moreover, the computational cost effort for a biclique key recovery is over 2 250 -bit, under 14-rounds for 2 40 data, and a preimage attack, it is over 2 120 -bit, under 14rounds [46]- [48]. Therefore, this computational effort leads to unfeasible known polynomial-time attacks between the plaintext CPF to the encrypted IDN or IDN to CPF, holding anonymity.…”
Section: B Ss and Ind Securitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The permutations P 512 and P 1024 of the Grøstl hash function have been two most heavily analyzed primitives in the SHA-3 hash function competition [32,37,19,23,40]. The best analysis on P 512 so far has been the discovery of differential properties up to 9 (out of 10) rounds with work 2 368 and memory 2 64 ; for the permutation P 1024 , the best analysis is the discovery of differential properties up to 10 (out of 14) rounds with work 2 392 and memory 2 64 .…”
Section: Security Analysis Of Grøstl Permutations P 512 and P 1024mentioning
confidence: 99%