Bid credits in simultaneous ascending auctions

Abstract

I study the impact of bid credits on simultaneous ascending auctions in a model where bidders potentially have complementary values. Although bid credits can lead to a more equitable distribution of items, I find an additional unintended consequence: bidders without credits are more exposed to winning a less desirable set of items and will drop out of the auction sooner when their competitors have credits.Calibrating the model to data from the Federal Communication Commission's sale of licenses in the 700 MHz guard bands, I find exposure reduced average non-credited dropout values by 5.7 percent but did not decrease revenues. * I would like to thank Suqin Ge, Melinda Miller, Xu Lin, and participants in Virginia Tech's applied micro reading group for their helpful comments.

Developments in spectrum management for communication services

“…Australia, Japan, the United States) (OECD, 2022 [59]), sometimes for specific or local needs. 32 In Italy, for example, Fastweb launched a Fixed Wireless Access (FWA) service in December 2020 using mmWave spectrum, and at the end of February 2022, Fastweb, in partnership with Qualcomm, announced plans to commercialize 5G standalone (SA) services using mmWave spectrum (RCR Wireless, 2022 [60]; Qualcomm, 2022 [61]).…”

“…defence, SRDs and railways requiring access to 874 -880 MHz/919 -925 MHz in Europe). 60 Regulators may also face pressure from incumbent users, which may not be inclined to accept additional users for fear of interference and possible degradation of their service. Different technologies serving the same application could also compete for the same part of spectrum.…”