We describe the extent to which the world's largest companies (in terms of revenues), achieve sales around the globe, and have been able to penetrate markets outside of their home region. We try to answer the following question: Has there been a recent increase in the world's largest firms achieving a global sales orientation, meaning a balanced, global distribution of sales? Rugman & Verbeke (2004) found that few of the 2002 Fortune Global 500 (Fortune Magazine 2002) firms, accounting for over 90% of the world's stock of FDI, actually had a global sales orientation. A majority of multinational enterprises (MNEs) were home-region oriented, suggesting that much work on corporate globalization was normative, rather than accurately describing reality. We present the equivalent data for the 2017 Fortune Global 500 (Fortune Magazine 2017) list. Our data confirm that many large firms are still home-region oriented, but to a lesser extent than before, with 36 MNEs (up from only nine in the 2002 list), now having widely distributed sales across the world's core economic regions. The question arises whether this relative increase in the number of MNEs with a global sales orientation holds any normative value for the firms that presently do not have such a sales distribution.

In public procurement auctions, governments routinely offer preferences to qualified firms in the form of bid discounts. Previous studies on bid discounting do not account for affiliation – a form of cost dependence between bidders that is likely to occur in a public procurement environment. Utilizing data from the New Mexico Department of Transportation’s Resident Preference Program, I develop and estimate an empirical model of firm bidding and entry that allows for affiliation in firms’ project costs. I find evidence of affiliation and show how it changes preference auction outcomes.

I study affirmative action subcontracting regulations in a model where governments use auctions to repeatedly procure goods and services at the lowest possible price. Through using disadvantaged subcontractors, prime contractors build relationships over time, resulting in lower subcontracting costs in future periods. I find that regulation in the form of a minimum subcontracting requirement expands bidder asymmetries, favoring prime contractors with stronger relationships over those with weaker ones. Simulations show that the manner in which relationships evolve determines not only the utilization of disadvantaged subcontractors but also the procurement costs attained under affirmative action.

I study the impact of bid credits on simultaneous ascending auctions in a model where bidders potentially have complementary values. Although bid credits can lead to a more equitable distribution of items, I find an additional unintended consequence: bidders without credits are more exposed to winning a less desirable set of items and will drop out of the auction sooner when their competitors have credits.Calibrating the model to data from the Federal Communication Commission's sale of licenses in the 700 MHz guard bands, I find exposure reduced average non-credited dropout values by 5.7 percent but did not decrease revenues. * I would like to thank Suqin Ge, Melinda Miller, Xu Lin, and participants in Virginia Tech's applied micro reading group for their helpful comments.

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