Bidding Decision in Land Auction Using Prospect Theory

Abstract

ABSTRACT. Land auction is widely practiced in company and government decisions, especially in China. Bidders are always faced with two or more auctions in the period of a decision cycle. The outcome of the auction is under high risk. The bidder's risk attitude and preference will have a great influence on his/her bidding price. Prospect theory is currently the main descriptive theory of decision under risk. In this paper, we will consider the preferences of the decision-makers in land bidding decisions with the multi-attribute additive utility and reference point method in cumulative prospect theory. Three land auction models are proposed based on the appearance time of the land auctions. The simultaneous model uses cumulative prospect theory without considering the relationships between the auctions. The time sequential model involves the exchange auction decisions at different time with the third-generation prospect theory. The event sequential model further considers the reference point prediction in sequential land auction decisions. The three models can help the decision-makers make better bidding price decision when they are faced with several land auctions in the period of a decision cycle. A case study illustrates the processes and results of our approaches.

Boundedly rational bidding decision for land auctions during the transformation of real estate markets

“…Gao 22 , 23 constructed a nonlinear function to portray bidders' regret psychology and solved the equilibrium strategy under bidder regret psychology behavior. Peng and Liu 19 studied decision-makers' multiple auction decisions in one decision cycle and considered the influence of bidders' risk attitudes and preferences on their bid prices using accumulative prospect theory.…”

Bounded Rational Bidding Decision for Land Auction in the Context of Real Estate Economic Transformation and Upgrading

“…Gao 15,16 constructed a nonlinear function to portray bidders' regret psychology and solved the equilibrium strategy for bidders' regret psychology behavior. Peng 17 et al studied the decision makers' multiple auction decisions in one decision cycle and considered the influence of bidders' risk attitudes and preferences on their bid prices using the accumulative prospect theory, but unfortunately, Peng fails to solve the equilibrium solution under the condition of considering risk preferences and attitudes and did not propose the applicable conditions for different risk preferences. The conclusions obtained have limitations.…”