Bilateral federalism and workforce development policy in Canada

Wood, Donna E.; Klassen, Thomas R.

doi:10.1111/j.1754-7121.2009.00074.x

Cited by 8 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…The LMDAs incorporated the number of active EI claimants served as a third measure. While the performance measures of the LMDAs are analyzed elsewhere (Wood and Klassen ), it is important to note how they reproduced the dilemmas of HRDC's internal RBAF. Critiques initially leveled against HRDC's internal performance measures were soon made of the LMDAs.…”

Section: Human Resource Development Canada's Results‐based Accountabimentioning

confidence: 99%

Performance measurement in Canadian employment service delivery, 1996‐2000

Grundy

2015

Can Public Adm

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This article draws on the theoretical insights of Foucauldian governmentality scholarship to analyze a performance measurement system developed by the federal government in the 1990s to assess employment services for the unemployed. An examination of Human Resource Development Canada's Results‐Based Accountability Framework yields insights into contestation and incoherence in performance measurement, often overlooked in governmentality research. This argument is developed by detailing three obstacles to implementing the performance measurement system: dilemmas of technical coordination, contestation by actors invested in different terms of measurement, and widespread recognition of the ambiguities of the performance data. The paper concludes by calling for more variegated accounts of governance in governmentality scholarship.

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Section: Human Resource Development Canada's Results‐based Accountabimentioning

confidence: 99%

Performance measurement in Canadian employment service delivery, 1996‐2000

Grundy

2015

Can Public Adm

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“…The LMAs granted provinces much greater scope in selecting clients and determining the type of programs offered. Ottawa officials believed that by increasing the number of indicators (to ten) and trusting that provinces would report accurately to their citizens, accountability through the LMAs would be better than through the LMDAs (Wood and Klassen ).…”

Section: Lmda and Lma Accountabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Accountability regimes in federal‐provincial Labour Market Agreements 1995‐2015

Wood¹,

Klassen²

2017

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: Workforce development policy in Canada has undergone extensive reforms in the past two decades, often driven by intergovernmental pressures. Many of these reforms, including the transfer of thousands of federal civil servants to the provinces, along with $2.5 billion annually, have occurred largely unnoticed by the public, or even recipients of services. Accountability measures have remained weak as the federal and provincial governments have few incentives to increase public scrutiny. In particular, transparency (making information available for public scrutiny) and justification (the provision of reasons for decisions) are inadequate. A more inclusive public accountability framework in the policy area needs to be developed that can support innovation in programs.Sommaire : Durant les deux dernières d ecennies, la politique de d eveloppement de la main-d'oeuvre au Canada a connu d'importantes r eformes, souvent motiv ees par des pressions intergouvernementales. Un grand nombre de ces r eformes, notamment le transfert de milliers de fonctionnaires f ed eraux vers les provinces ainsi que de 2,5 milliards de dollars par an, sont pass ees en grande partie inaperçues par le public et même par les b en eficiaires de services. Les mesures de reddition de compte des Ententes relatives au march e du travail demeurent faibles car les gouvernements f ed eral et provinciaux offrent peu de motivation pour accroître l'examen du public. La transparence (informations pour l'examen du public) et la justification (raisons des d ecisions) sont tout particulièrement inad equates. Un cadre de responsabilisation plus inclusif envers le public devraitêtre mis au point afin d'encourager l'innovation dans les programmes du march e du travail.

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“…Trois éléments sont d'une importance particulière pour l'identification de l'immigration comme ressource pour toutes les provinces : 1) l'achèvement du retrait du gouvernement fédéral des modes d'intervention et de financement des politiques sociales mis en place à partir de 1945 (Banting, 2005) ; 2) la remise en question de la participation fédérale -puis dans plusieurs instances la dévolution -en matière de politique du marché de l'emploi à partir des années 1990 (Wood et Klassen, 2009) ; et 3) un repositionnement de l'État fédéral en matière de support et de développement de l'économie canadienne. Ces éléments s'ajoutent à l'offre faite aux provinces, au cours de l'exercice de révision des programmes et des dépenses fédérales, de leur transférer les responsabilités concernant l'éta-blissement des immigrants (Vineberg, 2012).…”

Section: La Construction Provinciale Centrée Sur L'immigrationunclassified

La construction provinciale comme mécanisme : le cas de l’immigration au Manitoba

Paquet¹

2015

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Dans le cadre d’une analyse de la croissance des activités en immigration et en intégration de tous les gouvernements provinciaux depuis le début des années 1990, cet article propose une revitalisation de la notion de « construction provinciale ». En prenant comme point de départ les critiques de Robert A. Young, Philippe Faucher et André Blais (1984), il y est suggéré de repositionner la construction provinciale en tant que mécanisme social. Par le biais de cette approche mécanistique et suivant l’observation du mécanisme dans dix cas, il est avancé que le mécanisme de construction provinciale opère par le biais de trois composantes à l’échelle d’une province – l’activation, la consensualisation et l’institutionnalisation – et produit des effets variables, en fonction du contexte dans lequel il est enclenché. Le potentiel heuristique de cette approche est illustré en retraçant comment un mécanisme de construction provinciale centré sur l’immigration s’est mis en mouvement au Manitoba à partir des années 1990.As part of an analysis of the growth of the activities of the ten provincial governments in the domains of immigration and integration since the 1990s, this paper proposes a revitalization of the concept of “province building.” Taking as its starting point the criticisms of Robert A. Young, Philippe Faucher, and André Blais (1984), it is suggested to reposition province building as a social mechanism. Through this mechanistic approach and building on ten case studies, it proposes that the mechanism of province building operates via three components: activation, consensus building, and institutionalization. Despite these similarities in operation, the mechanism of province building produces variegated effects, depending on the context in which it is engaged. The heuristic potential of this approach is illustrated by tracing how a mechanism of province building centered on immigration has operated in Manitoba since the 1990s

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Bilateral federalism and workforce development policy in Canada

Cited by 8 publications

References 11 publications

Performance measurement in Canadian employment service delivery, 1996‐2000

Performance measurement in Canadian employment service delivery, 1996‐2000

Accountability regimes in federal‐provincial Labour Market Agreements 1995‐2015

La construction provinciale comme mécanisme : le cas de l’immigration au Manitoba

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