When it becomes necessary to do a thing the whole heart and soul should go into the measure.
-Thomas PaineIf you're gon'a love me, love me right.
-Jerry Lee LewisThings that are not worth doing, are not worth doing well.
-Harry JohnsonOne person's public good is another's public bad and so, perhaps, the public goods problem could be more generally described as the public commodities problem, 1 in which disagreement about the basic goal of a spending program complicates the decision of how much to spend to achieve that goal. Although public goods spending is a continuous variable, it often has a binary goal such as win a war, deter crime, provide transportation, or reduce poverty. To decide how much spending is necessary, society must answer both a normative and a positive question: Normatively, should the government adopt the goal of this spending program? Positively, given this spending program's goal, what is the optimal level of spending? 2 If the answer to the first question is yes, it may be desirable that the actual level of spending be set at the level that would be optimal given that goal, but spending may not be set at that level. This paper uses the median voter theorem to demonstrate that those who do not believe the government should pursue the goal and those who believe that the government can achieve the goal with relatively less spending can form a coalition to keep spending at a level below which most supporters (and possibly most citizens) believe is objectively the optimal amount of spending. Thus, even if voters have rational expectations about the amount necessary to achieve a goal, disagreement about whether or not to pursue the goal can cause underfunding bias.The median voter theorem has been used as a tool to examine the level of spending on public goods since developed and refined by Bowen (1944) and Black (1958) based on the original work by Hotelling (1929). It can be stated rather simply: on one dimensional issue, about which voters have single-peaked preferences, the median voter's position cannot lose under simple majority rule. 3 As long as all citizens vote, this result is strategy proof and holds true for any distribution of preferences (Mueller 1989, Ching 1997. There has been considerable discussion about if and when the median voter theorem holds, and if representatives' actions reflect the opinions of the median voter. 4 But that debate is not important for this paper, the problems in this paper can exist whether representatives vote according to their own ideology or their constituents' wishes.