Political action has affected postwar income distribution in the United States mainly through policy-induced variations in macroeconomic activity and government transfer benefits in proportion to total income. We present a small dynamic model of the connections among the partisan balance of power, macroeconomic fluctuations, transfer spending trends, and income distribution outcomes. The model is based on the premise that the parties have different distributional goals, and it is designed to identify how shifts in party control of the presidency and the strength of the parties in Congress have affected the distribution of after-tax, after-transfer income by influencing cyclical economic performance and the flow of resources to transfer programs. We therefore extend the “partisan theory” of macroeconomic policy to the domain of income distribution outcomes.

Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (or TRAP) laws impose medically unnecessary and burdensome regulations solely on abortion providers in order to make abortion services more expensive and difficult to obtain. Using event history analysis, this article examines the determinants of the enactment of a TRAP law by states over the period 1974–2008. The empirical results find that Republican institutional control of a state's legislative/executive branches is positively associated with a state enacting a TRAP law, while Democratic institutional control is negatively associated with a state enacting a TRAP law. The percentage of a state's population that is Catholic, public anti-abortion attitudes, state political ideology, and the abortion rate in a state are statistically insignificant predictors of a state enacting a TRAP law. The empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that abortion is a redistributive issue and not a morality issue.

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The authors examine the impact of political party control of government on the restrictiveness of a U.S. state's abortion policy, measured by the enactment of a parental involvement law. The empirical results show that (1) institutional control of a state's legislative and executive branches of government by the Republican Party increases the likelihood a state will enact a parental involvement law, while Democratic Party control decreases this likelihood; (2) the more conservative state public opinion is on abortion rights, the more likely a state is to enact a parental involvement law; (3) public anti-abortion attitudes do not act as a moderating force on the link between political party control and the enactment of a parental involvement law; and (4) the impact of political party control on the enactment of a parental involvement law has grown larger over time.

Using a disaggregated measure that allows us to examine the distribution of state and local tax burdens between high and low income groups better, this research finds that in many models, Democratic control is positively associated with a lower relative tax burden on the poor. The results are stronger for average Democratic strength in the state government than for unified Democratic strength. The results are strongest when comparing income groups just below the richest 1% (the next richest 2-5% and the next richest 6-20%) with the poorest 20%.Income inequality is strongly negatively associated with the degree of state and local tax progressivity.