Binary Opinion Dynamics with Stubborn Agents

Yildiz, Ercan; Ozdaglar, Asuman; Acemoğlu, Daron; Saberi, Amin; Scaglione, Anna

doi:10.1145/2538508

Cited by 282 publications

(226 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…The influence of a node is the influence obtained if that node was the leader. This definition is equivalent to the Harmonic Influence Centrality introduced in Vassio et al (2014) and implicitly used in Acemoglu et al (2013); Yildiz et al (2013). Also other definitions have bee used to evaluate nodes as potential leaders, see for instance Lin et al (2014); Fitch and Leonard (2016).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mean-field analysis of the convergence time of message-passing computation of harmonic influence in social networks

Rossi

Frasca

2017

IFAC-PapersOnLine

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The concept of harmonic influence has been recently proposed as a metric for the importance of nodes in a social network. A distributed message passing algorithm for its computation has been proposed by Vassio et al. (2014) and proved to converge on general graphs by Rossi and Frasca (2016a). In this paper, we want to evaluate the convergence time of this algorithm by using a mean-field approach. The mean-field dynamics is first introduced in a "homogeneous" setting, where it is exact, then heuristically extended to a non-homogeneous setting. The rigorous analysis of the mean-field dynamics is complemented by numerical examples and simulations that demonstrate the validity of the approach.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mean-field analysis of the convergence time of message-passing computation of harmonic influence in social networks

Rossi

Frasca

2017

IFAC-PapersOnLine

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“…Our model belongs to the non-Bayesian framework, which keeps the computations tractable. [10] studies binary 0-1 opinion dynamics. Here, we study the continuous opinion dynamics where the opinion belongs to a bounded interval.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Opinion Manipulation in Social Networks

Silva

2017

Static &Amp; Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations &Amp; Applications

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In this work, we are interested in finding the most efficient use of a budget to promote an opinion by paying agents within a group to supplant their true opinions. We model opinions as continuous scalars ranging from 0 to 1 with 1 (0) representing extremely positive (negative) opinion. We focus on asymmetric confidence between agents. The iterative update of an agent corresponds to the best response to other agents' actions. The resulting confidence matrix can be seen as an equivalent Markov chain. We provide simple and efficient algorithms to solve this problem and we show through an example how to solve the stated problem in practice.

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“…In recent work, Yildiz et al (2014) consider an extension where a subset of agents are "stubborn", i.e., their opinion is fixed to one of the two values. In our model, the state of an individual is a continuous variable which is updated by exchanging messages in favor of the options available to the agent.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Competitive Targeted Advertising Over Networks

Bimpikis

Ozdaglar

Yildiz

2016

Operations Research

Self Cite

120

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Recent advances in information technology have allowed firms to gather vast amounts of data regarding consumers' preferences and the structure and intensity of their social interactions. This paper examines a game-theoretic model of competition between firms which can target their marketing budgets to individuals embedded in a social network. We provide a sharp characterization of the optimal targeted advertising strategies and highlight their dependence on the underlying social network structure. Furthermore, we provide conditions under which it is optimal for the firms to asymmetrically target a subset of the individuals and establish a lower bound on the ratio of their payoffs in these asymmetric equilibria. Finally, we find that at equilibrium firms invest inefficiently high in targeted advertising and the extent of the inefficiency is increasing in the centralities of the agents they target. Taken together, these findings shed light on the effect of the network structure on the outcome of marketing competition between the firms.

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Binary Opinion Dynamics with Stubborn Agents

Cited by 282 publications

References 24 publications

Mean-field analysis of the convergence time of message-passing computation of harmonic influence in social networks

Mean-field analysis of the convergence time of message-passing computation of harmonic influence in social networks

Opinion Manipulation in Social Networks

Competitive Targeted Advertising Over Networks

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