Bird on Dispositions and Antidotes

Gundersen, Lars

doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00181

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…can not only fail to manifest, they can also fail to be present. 30 Like rubber can cease to be elastic because the material gets brittle when aged 28 Bird has already been criticised by Gunderson (Gunderson 2000) (with a reply by Bird (Bird 2000)) and by Sungho Choi (2003). 29 In fact, the insulator in the described experiment above shows that Coulomb's law can have an exception of the kind to be analysed in this paragraph, that is, if there is an insulator the force is not even there (as opposed to being counteracted against).…”

Section: Ceteris Paribus Clauses Shooting Up Like Mushroomsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Can Capacities Rescue us from Ceteris Paribus Laws?

Schrenk¹

2016

Dispositions and Causal Powers

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Section: Ceteris Paribus Clauses Shooting Up Like Mushroomsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Can Capacities Rescue us from Ceteris Paribus Laws?

Schrenk¹

2016

Dispositions and Causal Powers

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“…e.g. Mumford 1998, Malzkorn 2000, Gunderson 2000, and Jansen 2004 While being a pan-categoricalist, Lowe holds up the occurrent/dispositional distinction on the level of language and of formal ontological relations: for Lowe, there is a difference between occurrent and dispositional predication in natural languages and two exemplification relations matching to this. He could thus be called an 'exemplification dualist'.…”

Section: The Need For Exceptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dispositions, Laws, and Categories

Jansen

2007

Int Ontology Metaphysics

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After a short sketch of Lowe's account of his four basic categories, I discuss his theory of formal ontological relations and how Lowe wants to account for dispositional predications. I argue that on the ontic level Lowe is a pan-categoricalist, while he is a language dualist and an exemplification dualist with regard to the dispositional/categorical distinction. I argue that Lowe does not present an adequate account of disposition. From an Aristotelian point of view, Lowe conflates dispositional predication with hôs epi to poly statements about what is normally or mostly the case. Keywords Ontology . Categories . Laws of nature . Dispositions . Formal ontological relations 1 Lowe's Four-Category Ontology 1.1 How Many Categories Are There?Much dispute in recent ontological research is about how many -and which -basic ontological categories there are. Jonathan Lowe's answer is: four, not more and not less. This answer is not new. Not only does Lowe promulgate it for quite a while, 1 its tradition can even be traced back to the second chapter of Aristotle's Categories, where Aristotle lays out two intersecting dichotomies, one between universals and particulars and the other between inhering entities and their substrates. 2 Being influenced by John Locke, 3 Lowe's ontology is informed by this tradition, and thus, his categories are:-Objects (=individual substrates, including substances and lumps of stuff) -Kinds (=substance universals and stuff universals) -Modes (=individual properties or "tropes," and individual relations) -Attributes (=property universals, including relational universals) Int Ontology Metaphysics (

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“…17 17 There are a number of other proposals about how to overcome the problem of masking. Lars Bo Gundersen (2000, pp. 227–229; 2002, pp.…”

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Dispositions Unmasked

Hauska¹

2009

Theoria

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The problem of masking is widely regarded as a grave threat to the conditional analysis of dispositions. Unlike the difficulty arising in connection with finkish situations, the problem does not involve the (dis)appearance of a disposition upon the arrival of its activating conditions. Consequently, some promising responses to the finkish cases, in particular David Lewis's reformed analysis, are ill-equipped to deal with masks. I contend that the difficulty posed by masks can be surmounted by supplementing the counterfactual at the heart of the conditional analysis with a ceteris paribus clause. In spelling out this idea, I first examine the issue of provisos in nomic statements. Then I show how the employment of the ceteris paribus clause escapes the objections that are often raised against it, including the charge that the clause cannot informatively capture all the possible masks of a disposition.

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Bird on Dispositions and Antidotes

Cited by 4 publications

References 0 publications

Can Capacities Rescue us from Ceteris Paribus Laws?

Can Capacities Rescue us from Ceteris Paribus Laws?

Dispositions, Laws, and Categories

Dispositions Unmasked

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