Dispositions, Laws, and Categories

Abstract

After a short sketch of Lowe's account of his four basic categories, I discuss his theory of formal ontological relations and how Lowe wants to account for dispositional predications. I argue that on the ontic level Lowe is a pan-categoricalist, while he is a language dualist and an exemplification dualist with regard to the dispositional/categorical distinction. I argue that Lowe does not present an adequate account of disposition. From an Aristotelian point of view, Lowe conflates dispositional predication with hôs epi to poly statements about what is normally or mostly the case. Keywords Ontology . Categories . Laws of nature . Dispositions . Formal ontological relations 1 Lowe's Four-Category Ontology 1.1 How Many Categories Are There?Much dispute in recent ontological research is about how many -and which -basic ontological categories there are. Jonathan Lowe's answer is: four, not more and not less. This answer is not new. Not only does Lowe promulgate it for quite a while, 1 its tradition can even be traced back to the second chapter of Aristotle's Categories, where Aristotle lays out two intersecting dichotomies, one between universals and particulars and the other between inhering entities and their substrates. 2 Being influenced by John Locke, 3 Lowe's ontology is informed by this tradition, and thus, his categories are:-Objects (=individual substrates, including substances and lumps of stuff) -Kinds (=substance universals and stuff universals) -Modes (=individual properties or "tropes," and individual relations) -Attributes (=property universals, including relational universals) Int Ontology Metaphysics (

Are there essential forms in the social domain?

“…A more recent model for essential explanations is Jonathan Lowe's four‐category ontology, which also assumes substantial kinds characterised by generic attributes (Lowe, 2006; cf. Jansen, 2007, Sandstad & Jansen, 2022). If we ask why a certain particular substance, my favorite dophine Flipper, has a blowhole, we can refer to the substantial kind Dolphine that is instantiated by Flipper and point out that that kind is characterised by the generic attribute of Having‐a‐blowhole .…”