Black Sea Synergy: Success or Failure for the European Union

Abstract

Black Sea Region has been extensively on the agenda of the European Union (EU) since Romania and Bulgaria's membership in 2007. In 2008 the EU created "Black Sea Synergy" as a regional initiative in order to develop cooperation in the region in certain areas such as energy, transport and environment. Countries that take part in the Black Sea Synergy, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine are also part of "Eastern Partnership" which is another initiative simultaneously established with "Black Sea Synergy" as a part of the wider policy "European Neighbourhood Policy" (ENP). Besides some EU member states, Turkey, an official candidate country to the EU since 1999, and Russia, a so-called strategic partner of the EU are significant actors in the "Black Sea Synergy" initiative although they are not included in ENP. The initiative comprises various common practices with similar initiatives of the EU, such as providing financial assistance, supporting economic development and stability as well as encouraging economic and democratic reforms. Although the EU attempts to take initiative in solving the conflicts and increase security in the region, it has significant deficiencies in conducting these policies as the literature indicates. This article aims to analyse the "Black Sea Synergy" in light of the recent developments regarding Turkey's deteriorating relations with the EU and Russia's annexation of Crimea and destabilization of Eastern Ukraine. The article attempts to answer "to what extent do these developments affect "Black Sea Synergy"? and argues that, although the "Black Sea Synergy" is an initiative mainly comprising technical projects in some key sectors, the crisis in Ukraine and the relations between Turkey and the EU have exacerbated the "challenge" confronted by the EU in terms of implementing the objectives of the initiative. Obviously the political development of the "Black Sea Synergy" continues to be dependent on reciprocal relations between the EU, Russia and Turkey in light of the current events. However the technical character of the Black Sea Synergy has the potential to maintain the contacts between the partners despite the political disagreements among them. All in all, a cooperative environment with Turkey and Russia will provide a common ground for achieving the EU's general objectives in the Black Sea region despite the prevalence of structural deficiencies of the EU as a foreign policy actor. Makale, mevcut gelişmelerin "Karadeniz Sinerjisi"ni ne kadar etkileyeceği sorusuna cevap vermeye çalışmaktadır ve her ne kadar "Karadeniz Sinerjisi" temelde belirli sektörlerde gerçekleştirilen teknik projeleri kapsayan bir girişim olsa da, Ukrayna krizi ve Türkiye-AB ilişkilerindeki sorunların, girişimin amaçlarını gerçekleştirmek bakımından AB için önemli bir zorluk yarattığını öne sürmektedir. Mevcut durumda, Karadeniz Sinerjisi'nin siyasi gelişmeleri; AB, Rusya ve Türkiye arasındaki karşılıklı ilişkilere bağlı olmaya devam edecektir. Ancak yine de, "Karadeniz Sinerjisi"nin teknik...

Experiencing Europeanization in the Black Sea and South Caucasus

“…Prior to the Initiative, Turkey proved to be the unifying force for the Black Sea countries. Turkey established the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) in the early 1990s with a view to reconnect with the region and ascertain influence (Üstün 2010;Yazgan 2017). It was a shrewd soft power move to attempt during the unstable beginning of the post-Cold War period when the fall of the Soviet Union left a power vacuum in the region (Üstün 2010;Yazgan 2017).…”

“…Turkey established the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) in the early 1990s with a view to reconnect with the region and ascertain influence (Üstün 2010;Yazgan 2017). It was a shrewd soft power move to attempt during the unstable beginning of the post-Cold War period when the fall of the Soviet Union left a power vacuum in the region (Üstün 2010;Yazgan 2017). Although Turkey's economic perspective did not aim for regional integration, the BSEC did provide the structure for itself and post-communist countries to adjust during transition, and to acclimate to the global economy (Üstün 2010(Üstün , 135-36, Yazgan 2017).…”

“…Russia and Turkey have expressed that they do not believe they need reforms, and certainly not under the guidance and supervision of the EU's institutions or policies (Aydin-Düzgit 2018;Romanova 2009;Romanova 2016;Yazgan 2017).…”

“…The EU continues to clash with the two longstanding regional influences in the Black Sea basin, Russia and Turkey, who perceive the EU's normative power approach as antagonistic and insincere (Aydın-Düzgit 2018;De Franco et al 2015;Delcour 2011;Delcour 2015;Romanova 2009;Romanova 2016;Üstün 2010;Yazgan 2017). Yet, despite contentious EU bilateral relations, the Initiative has managed to attain agreement on multiple technical matters without following the EU's integrationist norm diffusion model (Üstün 2010, 130-135;Yazgan 2017). This outcome contradicts the EU's normative power approach, and challenges the value of its policies' partnership by conditionality framework.…”

“…Furthermore, although some scholars have proposed that the Neighbourhood Policy exemplifies a "horizontal network governance" model (Lavenex 2008;Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009), this is not corroborated by the EU's powerseeking behavior, namely its persistent norms campaign and claims to execute normative power. Additionally, the model does not adequately exemplify the Initiative's "technical character" (Yazgan 2017) that does not push for governance even though certain Initiative reports evoke the EU's normative mechanisms used elsewhere in its Neighbourhood Policy (European Commission 2019). This chapter contends that if the EU were in fact a normative power, the Initiative would unequivocally corroborate that; however, it is instead a collection of technical projects, and must refer to other EU activities in the region to form connections with the EU's normative aspirations.…”