Blockchain Technology as an Institution of Property

Abstract

This paper argues that the practical implementation of blockchain technology can be considered an institution of property similar to legal institutions. Invoking Penner's theory of property and Hegel's system of property rights, and using the example of bitcoin, it is possible to demonstrate that blockchain effectively implements all necessary and sufficient criteria for property without reliance on legal means. Blockchains eliminate the need for a third‐party authority to enforce exclusion rights, and provide a system of universal access to knowledge and discoverability about the property rights of all participants and how the system functions. The implications of these findings are that traditional property relations in society could be replaced by or supplemented with blockchain models, and implemented in new domains.

I Rest My Case! The Possibilities and Limitations of Blockchain-Based IP Protection

“…Blockchain-based IP registers can replace existing IP databases [5,17]. However, it is necessary to establish criteria, perform technical tests, and keep the interests of authors and users balanced [17].…”

“…However, it is necessary to establish criteria, perform technical tests, and keep the interests of authors and users balanced [17]. The authors go further and claim that Blockchain may be considered an institution of property, such as a legal institution, but it is too early to predict whether it will replace legal norms and property rights [5]. The work of [4] also identifies the advantages of using a Blockchain-based IP system, such as simplifying the registration process, reducing associated fees, dispensing the need to register in different jurisdictions, and self-managing of IP rights by the author, without the involvement of third parties.…”

Virtualizing diaspora: new digital technologies in the emerging transnational space

“…Blockchains may offer a novel basis for expanding or changing property law and related social institutions. Ishmaev (2017) suggests that the implications of this may be more profound than the anticipated replacement of legal frameworks by computer code (Swan 2015) or the rise of a techno-legal body of law -lex cryptographia (Wright and De Filippi 2015). The rise of 'smart property' -assets connected to the internet and transacted via computer code -may result in a qualitatively different property law institution.…”

The Ethical Limits of Blockchain-Enabled Markets for Private IoT Data

“…It should be noted that many of these proposals in some fashion reflect the ethos of the original blockchain implementation-Bitcoin-which was first proposed in a white paper by its anonymous creator Satoshi Nakamoto (2008). Emerging as a logical continuation of "cypherpunk" ideas on digital currencies, Bitcoin was conceived as a tool that could provide individuals with anonymity and freedom of market interactions; unimpeded by any centralized intermediary or authority (Karlstrøm 2014;Ishmaev 2017;Dierksmeier 2018). However, the moral merits of "cypherpunk" ideas are a topic worthy of a standalone investigation and can be omitted here for several reasons.…”

“…This criticism of propertization, however, is primarily expressed in the context of legal frameworks. Hence, given that blockchain-enabled application has already introduced qualitatively new types of property, and new types of regulation, reconsideration of these arguments may be warranted in a new technological context (Ishmaev 2017;Reijers and Coeckelbergh 2018;Filippi and Hassan 2018).…”