BlueFMCW: random frequency hopping radar for mitigation of interference and spoofing

Moon, Thomas; Park, Jounsup; Kim, Seungmo

doi:10.1186/s13634-022-00838-7

Cited by 15 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…Finally, the use of this algorithm, which is easy to implement, does not prevent normal operation of the radar, the hardware of which remains the same. A similar method used to combat interferences and attackers has been recently proposed in [ 36 ] and consists of splitting a chirp into multiple sub-chirps and randomizing every chirp period. Therefore, this random frequency hopping makes it difficult for the attacker to listen (e.g., with an spectrum analyzer or receiver) to the victim’s radar signal to learn the main radar parameters (such as frequency range and slope).…”

Section: Discussion and Countermeasuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A spoofing device based on the use of another radar that retransmits a replica of the signal has been presented in [ 35 ] for distance spoofing. A method for interference and spoofing mitigation based on a random-frequency hopping radar (BlueFMCW) has recently been proposed in [ 36 ], including experimental validation with a 77 GHz radar kit. In [ 37 ], a spoofing device prototype based on a phase-quadrature (IQ) mixer for FMCW radar at 5.8 GHz has been presented.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Spoofing Attacks on FMCW Radars with Low-Cost Backscatter Tags

Lázaro

Porcel

Lazaro

et al. 2022

Sensors

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This work studies the feasibility of using backscatter-modulated tags to introduce false information into a signal received by a frequency-modulated continuous-wave (FMCW) radar. A proof-of-concept spoofing device was designed in the 24 GHz ISM band. The spoofing device was based on an amplifier connected between two antennas, and modulation was carried out by switching the amplifier bias. The use of an amplifier allowed us to increase the level of spoofing signal compared with other modulated backscattering methods. The simulated and experimental results show that our method has the ability to generate a pair of false targets at different ranges and velocities depending on the modulation frequency of the chosen tag, since sidebands appear due to this modulation. Countermeasures to detect the spoofing attack based on changes in the slope of the frequency sweep between frames are also proposed.

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Section: Discussion and Countermeasuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Spoofing Attacks on FMCW Radars with Low-Cost Backscatter Tags

Lázaro

Porcel

Lazaro

et al. 2022

Sensors

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“…Radar detection techniques can track radar by listening for patterns of radio signals at particular frequencies. To avoid detection, a radar can use a frequency hoping spread spectrum: by rapidly switching frequency, the signal patterns can be hidden in background noise [30].…”

Section: Disrupting Interceptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Defence against Side-Channel Attacks for Encrypted Network Communication Using Multiple Paths

Haywood,

Bhatti

2024

Cryptography

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As more network communication is encrypted to provide data privacy for users, attackers are focusing their attention on traffic analysis methods for side-channel attacks on user privacy. These attacks exploit patterns in particular features of communication flows such as interpacket timings and packet sizes. Unsupervised machine learning approaches, such as Hidden Markov Models (HMMs), can be trained on unlabelled data to estimate these flow attributes from an exposed packet flow, even one that is encrypted, so it is highly feasible for an eavesdropper to perform this attack. Traditional defences try to protect specific side channels by modifying the packet transmission for the flow, e.g., by adding redundant information (padding of packets or use of junk packets) and perturbing packet timings (e.g., artificially delaying packet transmission at the sender). Such defences incur significant overhead and impact application-level performance metrics, such as latency, throughput, end-to-end delay, and jitter. Furthermore, these mechanisms can be complex, often ineffective, and are not general solutions—a new profile must be created for every application, which is an infeasible expectation to place on software developers. We show that an approach exploiting multipath communication can be effective against HMM-based traffic analysis. After presenting the core analytical background, we demonstrate the efficacy of this approach with a number of diverse, simulated traffic flows. Based on the results, we define some simple design rules for software developers to adopt in order to exploit the mechanism we describe, including a critical examination of existing communication protocol behavior.

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“…During the recent decade, advances in nanoscale Complementary Metal-Oxide-Semiconductor (CMOS) technologies have boosted the maximum oscillation frequency ( f max ) of transistors far from the mm-wave range, spurring an explosion of high-frequency applications such as millimeter-wave line-of-sight (LOS) wireless communication link system in the E-band, automotive radars in 77 GHz, or 3D imaging systems [ 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 ]. For the frequency modulated continuous wave (FMCW) radar sensor applications, frequency hopping approaches have been introduced to avoid intentional interference and security threats such as spoofing and jamming attacks [ 9 , 10 ]. A frequency synthesizer is an important part of the frequency hopping FMCW radar that is required to achieve a wide tuning range, and it also requires a low phase noise to ensure desired detection sensitivity and high output power to ensure the proper operation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A 78.8–84 GHz Phase Locked Loop Synthesizer for a W-Band Frequency-Hopping FMCW Radar Transceiver in 65 nm CMOS

Trinh¹,

Nam²,

Song³

et al. 2022

Sensors

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A W-band integer-N phase-locked loop (PLL) for a frequency hopping frequency modulation continuous wave (FMCW) radar is implemented in 65-nm CMOS technology. The cross-coupled voltage-controlled oscillator (VCO) was designed based on a systematic analysis of the VCO combined with its push-pull buffer to achieve high efficiency and high output power. To provide a frequency hopping functionality without any overhead in the implementation, the center frequency of the VCO is steeply controlled by the gate voltage of the buffer, which effectively modifies the susceptance of the VCO load. A stand-alone VCO with the proposed architecture is fabricated, and it achieves an output power of 13.5 dBm, a peak power efficiency of 9.6%, and a tuning range of 3.5%. The phase noise performance of the VCO is −92.6 dBc/Hz at 1-MHz and −106.1 dBc/Hz at 10 MHz offset. Consisting of a third-order loop filter and a divider chain with a total modulus of 48, the locking range of the implemented PLL with the cross-coupled VCO is recorded from 78.84 GHz to 84 GHz, and its phase noise is −85.2 dBc/Hz at 1-MHz offset.

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BlueFMCW: random frequency hopping radar for mitigation of interference and spoofing

Cited by 15 publications

References 18 publications

Spoofing Attacks on FMCW Radars with Low-Cost Backscatter Tags

Spoofing Attacks on FMCW Radars with Low-Cost Backscatter Tags

Defence against Side-Channel Attacks for Encrypted Network Communication Using Multiple Paths

A 78.8–84 GHz Phase Locked Loop Synthesizer for a W-Band Frequency-Hopping FMCW Radar Transceiver in 65 nm CMOS

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