Bluffing as a Rational Strategy in a Simple Poker-Like Game Model

Abstract

We present a simple adaptive learning model of a poker-like game, by means of which we show how a bluffing strategy emerges very naturally and can also be rational and evolutionarily stable. Despite their very simple learning algorithms, agents learn to bluff, and the most bluffing player is usually the winner.

Poker as a skill game: rational versus irrational behaviors

“…As mentioned above, players can bluff [18], i.e., their behavior can deceive their opponents about the true strength of their hand. The derivation of the word poker suggests that it is mainly a game about bluffing and hence a psychological game.…”

“…Hence, some kind of psychological analysis is performed by players during the challenge. As mentioned above, players can bluff [18], i.e. their behavior can deceive their opponents about the true strength of their hand.…”