2007
DOI: 10.1007/s11149-007-9045-9
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Board monitoring, firm risk, and external regulation

Abstract: Regulation, Board monitoring, Firm risk, Board independence, G34,

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Cited by 67 publications
(54 citation statements)
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References 70 publications
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“…This suggestion is supported by results of Vafaes' (1999) and Adams' (2005) investigations stating that boards respond to poor performances by raising their level of board activity. As per Brick and Chidambaran (2008), the danger of discordance between board members increases when the firm performs poorly. This may result in an increase in the board's activity, because, inter alia, directors may want to protect themselves from being blamed for not having taken action when needed.…”
Section: The Board Of Directorsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This suggestion is supported by results of Vafaes' (1999) and Adams' (2005) investigations stating that boards respond to poor performances by raising their level of board activity. As per Brick and Chidambaran (2008), the danger of discordance between board members increases when the firm performs poorly. This may result in an increase in the board's activity, because, inter alia, directors may want to protect themselves from being blamed for not having taken action when needed.…”
Section: The Board Of Directorsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Alignment of interests between investors and executives, however, could also increase risk taking if this is in the interests of investors. In this context, Pathan () finds a positive relationship between strong bank boards (measured by board size and independence, among others) and banks’ risk taking, but Brick and Chidambaran () find the opposite relationship between board monitoring (proxied by board independence) and firm risk in the absence of regulation.…”
Section: Literature Review and Hypothesis Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In a different context (tiiat of executive board monitoring). Brick & Chidambaran (2008) also consider the interplay between regulation and risk-taking. They demonstrate that increased regulation has driven an increase in board monitoring as evidenced by data gathered between 1996 and 2003.…”
Section: Business Culture and Riskmentioning
confidence: 99%