Boards, and the Directors Who Sit on Them

Adams, Renée B.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3002219

Cited by 31 publications

(37 citation statements)

References 187 publications

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“…This study underscores the complexity of the mechanisms involved in strategic stakeholder management. This points to the importance of the personal makeup of boards of directors (Adams 2017). Who sits on the board (or in the corner office) matters at least as much as the formal rules she is expected to follow and the price signals she receives from the market.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Shareholders and Stakeholders around the World: The Role of Values, Culture, and Law in Directors’ Decisions

Licht

Adams

2019

SSRN Journal

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We present evidence on the way personal and institutional factors could together guide public company directors in decision-making concerning shareholders and stakeholders. In a sample comprising more than nine hundred directors originating from over fifty countries and serving in firms from twenty three countries, we confirm that directors around the world hold a principled, quasi-ideological stance towards shareholders and stakeholders, called shareholderism, on which they vary in line with their personal values. We theorize and find that in addition to personal values, directors' shareholderism level associates with cultural norms that are conducive to entrepreneurship. Among legal factors, only creditor protection exhibits a negative correlation with shareholderism, while general legal origin and proxies for shareholder and employee protection are unrelated to it.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Shareholders and Stakeholders around the World: The Role of Values, Culture, and Law in Directors’ Decisions

Licht

Adams

2019

SSRN Journal

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“…The corporate governance literature typically distinguishes between one‐tier or two‐tier systems when categorizing a company's management structure (Adams, 2017; Gerner‐Beuerle & Schuster, 2013). In one‐tier systems, the corporate board typically consists of both executive and nonexecutive directors.…”

Section: German Corporate Governance Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Gender spillovers from supervisory boards to management boards

2021

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This study investigates gender spillovers from women on supervisory boards to women on management boards in a two‐tier system with employee codetermination. The supervisory board consists of a nominating committee mainly responsible for the appointment of directors in the management board. By combining similarity attraction theory with power theory, we predict that only female shareholder representatives who serve on the nominating committee drive the positive effect on the presence of women on management boards. The results of the correlated random effects models in a sample of 95 German codetermined and publicly listed companies (2009–2016) confirm the predicted relationship.

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“…However, none of these studies have investigated the concurrence of both politicization and financial experience in a director. As Adams (2017, p. 67) notes, “directors are not one-dimensional; directors have multiple attributes, each of which may or may not add value to the firm.” If we consider only the effect of a director with previous financial experience, we would expect an improvement of his or her effectiveness on the board, both as a monitor and an advisor. As several studies show, this feature can even improve when combined with other complementary factors (i.e., independence) related to the increase in the director’s effectiveness, either as a monitor or an advisor (Gul & Leung, 2004; Kroll et al, 2008).…”

Section: Theoretical Background and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Politicians in disguise and financial experts on the board: Evidence from Spanish cajas

Andrés

García-Rodríguez

Romero‐Merino

et al. 2020

BRQ Business Research Quarterly

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This study offers insight into the role of board politicization on the Spanish cajas’ performance from a dual perspective. First, we analyze the effect of a new kind of political directors who occupy board seats as representatives of stakeholders outside the public administrations while maintaining a political affiliation. We call these “hidden” political directors as politicians in disguise. Second, we analyze how political interests can prevent directors with financial expertise from applying their knowledge to improve cajas’ performance. Using a sample of hand-collected data from 45 Spanish cajas, we find that politicians in disguise destroy value in the caja and that politically motivated financial experts on the board do not benefit cajas’ performance. JEL CLASSIFICATION: G34, G21, G28

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Boards, and the Directors Who Sit on Them

Cited by 31 publications

References 187 publications

Shareholders and Stakeholders around the World: The Role of Values, Culture, and Law in Directors’ Decisions

Shareholders and Stakeholders around the World: The Role of Values, Culture, and Law in Directors’ Decisions

Gender spillovers from supervisory boards to management boards

Politicians in disguise and financial experts on the board: Evidence from Spanish cajas

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