Bottom-Up Challenges to National Democracy: Mexico's (Legal) Subnational Authoritarian Enclaves

Benton, Allyson Lucinda

doi:10.5129/001041512800078931

Cited by 84 publications

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“…The database includes all 31 states, even Oaxaca, which holds nonpartisan elections in most municipalities. Parties operate in Oaxaca's nominally nonpartisan municipalities, with municipal leaders delivering partisan‐based support in state and federal elections (Benton ), so state elections serve as a proxy.…”

Section: Mexico's Municipal Debt Data Methodological Concerns and Smentioning

confidence: 99%

The Impact of Parties and Elections on Municipal Debt Policy in Mexico

Benton

Smith

2016

Governance

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Opportunistic electoral fiscal policy cycle theory suggests that all subnational officials will raise fiscal spending during elections. Ideological partisan fiscal policy cycle theory suggests that only left‐leaning governments will raise election year fiscal spending, with right‐leaning parties choosing the reverse. This article assesses which of these competing logics applies to debt policy choices. Cross‐sectional time‐series analysis of yearly loan acquisition across Mexican municipalities—on statistically matched municipal subsamples to balance creditworthiness across left‐ and right‐leaning governments—shows that all parties engage in electoral policy cycles but not in the way originally thought. It also shows that different parties favored different types of loans, although not always according to partisan predictions. Both electoral and partisan logics thus shape debt policy decisions—in contrast to fiscal policy where these logics are mutually exclusive—because debt policy involves decisions on multiple dimensions, about the total and type of loans.

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Section: Mexico's Municipal Debt Data Methodological Concerns and Smentioning

confidence: 99%

The Impact of Parties and Elections on Municipal Debt Policy in Mexico

Benton

Smith

2016

Governance

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“…8 Work on Mexico has also addressed the unevenness of democracy across subnational units (see for instance Cornelius, Eisenstadt and Hindley, 1999), and national level effects of local undemocratic practices (Benton, 2012).…”

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confidence: 99%

The Politics of Federalism in Argentina: Implications for Governance and Accountability

2012

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. 1 Abstract * This paper contributes to an agenda that views the effects of policies and institutional reforms as dependent on the structure of political incentives for national and subnational political actors. The paper studies political incentive structures at the subnational level and the mechanisms whereby they affect national-level politics and policymaking at the national level in Argentina, a highly decentralized middle-income democracy, Argentina. The Argentine political system makes subnational political power structures very influential in national politics. Moreover, most Argentine provinces are local bastions of power dominated by entrenched elites, characterized by scarce political competition, weak division of powers, and clientelistic political linkages. Political dominance in the provinces and political importance at the national level reinforce each other, dragging the Argentine political and policymaking system towards the practices and features of its most politically backward regions. Terms of use: Documents inJEL classifications: H11, H70, H77, D72, D73, D78

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“…For example, in Giraudy's (2010) democratization index level, only 5 out of 24 provinces between 1983 and 2006 reached high, sustained levels of democracy, while the rest have made little to no progress. But the uneven distribution of democracy in the subnational entities in Argentina is not a characteristic unique to this country but rather a common pattern within the region (Fox 1994;Snyder 1999;Benton 2012).…”

Section: The Political Manipulation Of Subnational High Courts In Argmentioning

confidence: 99%

I Want It All, and I Want It Now: The Political Manipulation of Argentina's Provincial High Courts

Castagnola¹

2012

Journal of Politics in Latin America

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Provincial supreme courts are important players in local politics because justices can affect the interest of the ruling governors; however, no research has addressed the factors that affect judicial turnover in provincial high courts in new democracies. This research attempts to fill this gap by using original data on the 525 departures of all provincial high court justices in Argentina from 1983 to 2009. My guiding hypothesis is that the stability of a justice on the bench depends on the political proximity of the justice to the ruling governor rather than on the executive's institutional capacity to impeach. This study reveals that being aligned with the faction of the ruling governor is a major factor in accounting for judicial turnover not only in single-party provinces, as expected, but also in multi-party provinces. Because provincial politics have proven to be a major source of power for national politicians, governors would prefer to have a friendly court during their administration.

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Bottom-Up Challenges to National Democracy: Mexico's (Legal) Subnational Authoritarian Enclaves

Cited by 84 publications

References 0 publications

The Impact of Parties and Elections on Municipal Debt Policy in Mexico

The Impact of Parties and Elections on Municipal Debt Policy in Mexico

The Politics of Federalism in Argentina: Implications for Governance and Accountability

I Want It All, and I Want It Now: The Political Manipulation of Argentina's Provincial High Courts

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